The full attention of Taiwan, and the international community's interest in Taiwan, are focused on the aftermath of the presidential election.
But beyond that, people of Taiwan (and fellow democracies everywhere) should know that the democratic system being pursued by President Chen Shui-bian (
In the US, Chen's actions are widely praised and most people believe that he will retain the presidency. On this assumption there are two issues that look to be paramount in the US-Taiwan relationship in the second Chen administration.
The two issues are referendums and a new constitution.
The problems that have emerged in the past year should be a wake-up call for what we see ahead. If what we see and read in the media is reasonably accurate, both sides are aiming to repeat their errors in the future.
One such error was the referendum talk late last year in which the referendum's objectives were not fully explained at first, followed by the inevitable outrage from Beijing and opposition to any referendum by many China experts in the US, both in and out of government. This position was changed thereafter when it was realized that holding referendums is a legitimate act in a democratic society. It was the topic of the referendum that caused problems.
There are many views in Taiwan on why the referendum failed, focusing either on the way it was carried out or on its subject. Doubtless, there will be efforts to try again. The first step, a law permitting referendums, is already accomplished. It is, however, controversial. It gives little authority to the Executive Yuan and probably far too much to the Legislative Yuan. It also limits the subject matter that can be raised in a referendum, but that could be changed if the make-up of the legislature changes.
As long as the cross-strait relationship remains in its present state, this subject will be one of the most sensitive in Taiwan's relations with both China and the US.
In addition to this, there is the objective of writing a new constitution or amending the present one in the years ahead.
The timetable calls for public debate first, a referendum in 2006 and enactment in 2008. Beijing immediately claimed this was a stepping stone to independence, and some experts in and out of the US government immediately bought in to this idea. In the US there was and remains little public discussion of why there is a need for change, aside from China's opposition.
There is a tendency among foreign policy experts to see domestic politics in another country, or domestic obstacles that a country has in developing a consensus, or a political leader pursuing an objective to strengthening his or her position in domestic politics, as being irresponsible or wrong, or at the very least to see that leader as a troublemaker if his or her policy objective is inimical to academic or foreign policy objectives. These same problems in one's own country, of course, are considered reasonable, understandable and a legitimate basis for pursuing the policies being made.
In addition, policymakers, or the decision-makers above them, having gone through some kind of internal debate or consensus process, sometimes believe that a timely sharing in that process with other countries who may be affected is secondary. Both these qualities exist in the US?Taiwan relationship. Given the circumstances, and the changes that are so rapidly taking place in the world order, not having a better understanding of each other's plans and objectives could lead to disaster.
For example, on the issue of changing the Constitution, the US has no direct interest in what kind of constitution Taiwan wants. That is up to the people of Taiwan. Taiwan's very large and important neighbor has threatened war over this subject, however, and the US has commitments to help prevent this (if war is not directly provoked by Taiwan itself). At the same time, Taiwan has a legitimate need to eliminate or change items in the Constitution that hinder proper government.
In the case of changing the Constitution, there are differences in Taiwan about whether the country should draft a new constitution or amend the existing one. There are many more controversial issues, and the process of rewriting or amending the Constitution is very complex and difficult.
Amending the Constitution is not setting any precedent. The former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government enacted several amendments, but didn't succeed in enacting others. (One interesting example was that it did not have the three-quarters majority needed to legislate a requirement that a majority in any presidential election would be needed, so a compromise was necessary. This amendment did not succeed because the then opposition insisted on a quid pro quo -- a referendum law).
So instead of a public complaint such as the Dec. 9 statement of last year, made before the referendum issue was fully explained, both sides should develop a new dialogue to work out a mutually agreeable understanding over those elements that are being proposed and those that legitimately concern the US. In changing circumstances, coordination should precede, not follow, public debate.
Change in Taiwan has been very rapid. The laws have not kept up. Even without any connection to cross-strait relations or constitutional amendments, changes will continue.
Taiwan's participatory democracy almost assures the frequent use of referendums, for example. Policies will be increasingly be based on domestic political requirements.
Yet China will do all it can to slow such political activity. To prevent China from forcing an unwanted relationship on Taiwan, the US will have to take into account subversive activities such as pressuring countries to exclude Taiwan from international organizations while at the same time maintaining an effective relationship with both China and Taiwan.
The administration of US President George W. Bush has made it clear that the US will be involved, one way or the other, if tensions in the Taiwan Strait grow too high. It has also made it clear that it will oppose any unilateral effort to change the cross-strait status quo. To do this, it is also very clear that establishing an effective bilateral relationship beyond what we now have is badly needed.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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