In all the tumult of Taiwan's election campaign, a strong reason for voting is happening in Hong Kong. The 1.6 million new voters in Taiwan especially should ponder deeply about what their vote will mean in developing a relationship with a China that covets Taiwan and its people.
In older democracies, when voters in a presidential election are faced with a choice that is not attractive to them, they often simply don't vote. The US is a prime example. Lately it seems every election for president in the US is that way, and the result is that perhaps half the voters just let the other half decide. Taiwan is not an old democracy -- it is a new one that still has very fundamental decisions to make on the kind of country each voter, and their children, will live in.
The "one country, two systems" practiced in the Hong Kong, while now opposed by both parties in Taiwan, is still meant to be the solution Beijing seeks for a future Taiwan that would be a part of China. Whenever the time comes for negotiations, and it is possible it will be when the new voters of today are still voting, some variant of the model will likely be the offer from China. The leadership chosen now, therefore, will be vital in developing the laws and traditions that assure the people of Taiwan, unlike those in Hong Kong, have the power to choose what they want.
What has been happening in Hong Kong is the first step in understanding the problems a Taiwanese voter might have to face. The British and the territory's business elite had for years prevented a power transfer to the people in making any meaningful political choices. Negotiating the turnover, therefore, was between the political leadership on both sides, with no involvement of the people.
The leaders from London and those Hong Kongers who had done well in business wanted to keep it that way. Until the last few years of its existence as a UK colony, the idea of developing a self-ruling democracy there was opposed. The rationale was that when it came time for the turnover to Beijing, real democracy would not be acceptable to the new owners, and could only bring instability. The last governor, who came after negotiations were completed, began a program of bottom up democracy, but it was much too late.
The negotiations for the turnover between the UK and Beijing were difficult and long, but the broad outcome was pre-ordained under the "one country, two systems" model. The UK negotiators had done well, given that they had few chips to play, but the people of Hong Kong, whose livelihood was at stake, had no choice in the matter.
China, in taking Hong Kong, was committed "not to curtail Hong Kong's freedom nor change its systems for at least 50 years. Also, China accepted "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" with a "high degree of autonomy." There were occasional infractions of the rules on elements of the Basic Law, but not enough to seriously arouse the international community or strengthen the weak opposition in the territory itself.
Then, early last year, Hong Kong's chief executive introduced national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law that generated massive resistance. The largest demonstration since the territory returned to Beijing's control, with some 500,000 people taking part, and a later defeat of China-friendly parties in an election, clearly generated concern in Beijing. Following a trip by Hong Kong officials to Beijing to discuss democratic reform in January, China began changing the rules for the territory.
Since last month, there has been a string of reminders from Beijing that forward movement on democratic reform would be very slow, if at all. Only "patriots," (which will be defined by Beijing), can be elected. Those who took part in last July's demonstration will not be qualified to be elected or appointed in the government. It was the first time Beijing has intervened directly in such matters. Before that, warnings and personnel matters went through the chief executive.
In changing the rules, China is reneging on its commitments to Hong Kong in the "one country, two systems" model. The new rules are even stronger than those originally established by the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (
There may be many other reasons, mostly regarding Hong Kong itself, but one may be Taiwan. While Beijing places obstacles on news about such matters as elections in Taiwan, a great many people in China know about them nonetheless. The open, boisterous public debates taking place in Taiwan must have some effect on the people who lack such rights in China. Tightening the rules in Hong Kong at this time may be the kind of message Beijing wants to send to its own constituencies.
"One country, two systems" was developed originally for Taiwan. It was put into play first with Hong Kong only because the turnover of the colony to China was based on expiration of the British lease on the New Territories. Given its growing problems, Hong Kong may be demonstrating that the model doesn't fit all sizes. In fact, it may not fit any size.
When Deng hatched the model, there was much discussion about the likelihood of success. Taiwan almost immediately rejected the idea but most observers thought this was largely negotiating rhetoric -- automatic, without much thought being given to it. In any event, within a decade, Taiwan was into political reform (ie, democratization). By then it was clear that the "one country, two systems" was meant to be a two economic systems, but not a two political systems.
Today there is an even stronger case. In Taiwan the laws have not kept pace with the rapid political revolution that has occurred there. So if one asks why vote, the answer is clear. To participate in and have the laws updated to assure the people of Taiwan's right to choose, as the people of Hong Kong under the "one country, two systems" have not been able to do.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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