With all the fire between the pan-green and pan-blue camps over the legality of the referendum, as well as the methods of voting, so far there has been very little attention focused on the pros and cons of the referendum questions themselves. This is unfortunate, because one of the main values of the referendum is what it may reveal what voters really think about the crucial issues in cross-strait relations.
The presidential election itself poses a straightforward three-way choice: President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) or staying at home. One winner will emerge unequivocally.
The referendum, on the other hand, is a good deal more complex. There are nine possible combinations of votes that voters can cast: yes or no on each of the two questions, plus not taking one or both of the ballots.
What does each of these choices mean? What will the result tell us about what people think?
These are critical questions that have so far been largely ignored by both domestic and international commentators.
Let us start first with the five possibilities involving not accepting one or both of the referendum ballots.
In a normal country, choosing not to vote indicates either lack of interest or inability to choose. Furthermore, it is important to note that in countries such as Italy, which set referendum turnout thresholds, not voting becomes a different way of saying "no" to the question, and the new Referendum Law (公民投票法) contains such a provision.
However, Taiwan's situation is not "normal" in this regard, because the act of holding a referendum itself is controversial. Given the fact of international pressure from China, the US and others not to have referendums at all, the KMT campaign for voters to boycott the referendum takes on a more sinister tone than it would in a country like Italy.
If large numbers of voters refuse to participate at all in this first-ever referendum, it could be interpreted as self-denial of the very right to direct democracy itself. It could also set a dangerous precedent of caving in to international pressure on fundamental questions of democracy.
Non-voters, therefore, need to be analyzed with particular care, starting with differentiating voters who go to the polls from those who do not.
Those who simply stay home should not be considered supporters of the KMT's boycott, but rather people who are disaffected in a "normal" way or are simply unable to vote.
Instead, the key figure will be the number of people who show up to vote for president but refuse to take either of the referendum ballots. This can be considered the upper limit of the number of "anti-referendum" votes.
It will be difficult to know immediately how many of these voters may in fact hope to vote in other referendums in the future, but opposed this one, whether out of exasperation with Chen or for some other reason.
On the other hand, voters who take one of the ballots but not the other can not be said to be rejecting referendums per se, but only one of the questions currently before them. Here we can apply the normal logic of the turnout threshold and consider the ballot not taken to be the same as a "no" vote on that question, allowing us to dispense with analyzing those four combinations separately.
This still leaves us with the core of the issue, the "beef": "yes" or "no" on two questions -- four possible substantive positions. Let us examine them one by one.
First, the government's position: "yes" on both questions, supporting both "strengthening anti-missile defenses" as well as "holding talks with China to establish a peaceful and stable framework for cross-strait interaction." The thinking behind this stance is traditional international relations theory? -- that one should negotiate, but only from a position of strength.
Voters in this category may be termed "pragmatists." They feel that cross-strait dialogue is important, and that upgrading the nation's defenses, of which anti-missile defenses are a key part, must be carried out simultaneously in order for Taiwan to have enough self-confidence to not be forced into concessions.
Second, voters who choose "no" on question one (including those who take only the second ballot) and "yes" on question two may be termed "doves." They support dialogue, but oppose any further military buildup. This position has been staked out publicly by a number of activists for peace and social welfare. Taken to a logical extreme this view may rest on Gandhian principles -- that no military solutions to disputes are acceptable.
Third, voters who choose "yes" on question one and "no" on question two may be termed "hawks." They support building up the nation's capacity for self-defense but think that entering into any kind of framework with China is pointless or even risky. In practice, they prefer to put off engaging in serious dialogue either until China demonstrates more sincerity, or even until it democratizes.
Fourth, voters who take one or both ballots but vote "no" on both questions are a bit harder to decipher.
They oppose increased spending on missile defenses, and they also feel that cross-strait dialogue is a waste of time. Perhaps they can be described as thinking that cross-strait relations are not a top priority for the nation in general: they are basically content with the status quo and would rather the nation's political focus shifted to other areas, such as the economy.
All four of these positions are rational and defensible. Which will voters choose? We will know on March 20.
Bo Tedards is a co-coordinator of the Taiwan Network for Free Elections.
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