Beijing fears and opposes any referendum held by Taiwan. When I visited Washington with several other members of the Legislative Yuan's Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee last June, we had already heard that Beijing had been lobbying and putting pressure on the US State Department in the hope of preventing Taiwan from holding a referendum.
Beijing is worried that even if Taiwan's first referendum does not touch upon the issue of independence, its future referendums will, just like the result of a once-opened Pandora's box. To prevent such a scenario, Beijing opposes any referendum held in Taiwan.
Chinese leaders originally thought that the US would restrain Taiwan. Yet to their disappointment and anger, Washington permitted President Chen Shui-bian (
Beijing's leading task force on Taiwan affairs held a few meetings after mid-November last year. Dissatisfaction was generally felt about Chen's higher degree of popularity than Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰), as well as the forecast that Chen will win his re-election bid in the March 20 presidential election. The hawks in Beijing urged President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) to be tougher toward Chen and Washington.
Premier Wen Jiabao (
Misled by his staff, US President George W. Bush announced in front of Wen at the White House his opposition to a unilateral change in the status quo by the Taiwanese leader. As the next day's Washington Post editorial wrote, Bush was kowtowing to Beijing.
However, Washington gave a moderate response to the two referendum questions Chen unveiled on Jan. 16, and said that it did not think a peace referendum would be dangerous. This change worried Beijing, which felt that Washington was not entirely dependable. It thus employed various diplomatic channels, including Hu's visit to France, to coax other countries into opposing Taiwan's referendum.
Tempted by business opportunities in China, French President Jacques Chirac went along with Beijing, saying that he opposed Taiwan's referendum and that Taiwan's peace referendum was wrong and would increase cross-strait tensions. Even more absurdly, Chirac urged the EU to lift the embargo on arms sales to Beijing, simply because France wanted to line its pockets by selling weapons to China. Yet which is more likely to increase cross-strait tensions, France's arms sales to China, or a referendum on peace?
Paris' influence on Taiwan is limited, after all. The US is Beijing's main focal point in its international efforts to oppose Taiwan's referendum. Therefore, Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office of China's State Council, visited Washington with a lobby group earlier this month.
US officials describe Beijing's current situation as a no-win situation: if it acts softly on the Taiwan issue, it won't be effective; yet if it adopts harsh measures, Taiwanese voters will react by supporting Chen Shui-bian, repeating the outcome of the presidential elections in 1996 and 2000. Having exhausted its strategies, Beijing can only resort to the international community, especially the US, in its efforts to pressure Taiwan to give up its plan to hold a referendum.
Is it possible that Beijing will disregard history's previous lessons and act tough toward Taiwan in order to hinder the March referendum? US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said at a press conference that Beijing did not give him any promises during his visit there. But other US officials said that Chinese officials, including Chen Yunlin, were moderate in their remarks and that they could not see Beijing resorting to armed force. And the US has recognized and encouraged Beijing when it acts with restraint and rationality.
Has Beijing outsourced its anti-referendum propaganda campaign to the pan-blue camp? Some pro-China media and scholars are making an all-out effort to oppose the referendum. Is this a mere coincidence of self-interests, or are they actively cooperating with Beijing and acting as its pawns?
Some pan-blue legislators also visited with US officials and think tanks to express their opposition to the peace referendum. They criticized it as illegal, unnecessary and not urgent. Obviously, they were hoping Washington would somehow intervene and stop the Chen administration from holding the referendum.
US officials said they found it a novel experience to see Taiwanese legislators express opposing views in front of them, jokingly saying they were auditing a debate session in the Legislative Yuan.
I have spoken with numerous US Congress members, but I have never seen any of them publicly criticize their president. The ruling and opposition parties should share a consistent view in their dealings with other countries.
Unfortunately, Taiwan's diplomacy is an extension of domestic politics. That is why a domestic dispute in Taiwan was brought to Washington.
Some pan-blue legislators and journalists expect the US to stop the March 20 referendum and are even encouraging Washington to "punish" Taiwan. However, Washington described the current US-Taiwan relationship as "intimate and good" during my visit, and although there were some tensions and communication problems a short time ago, the bilateral interaction is now back on track. They expressed their respect for Taiwan's democratic system and they said it is up to the Taiwanese people to decide if a referendum is to be held.
The US government does not think the two referendum questions will change the status quo, but it will study developments after the new president, whoever he may be, is sworn in on May 20. They reiterated that the official position of the US is neutral, but the officials I spoke to implied that they privately believe Chen Shui-bian will be re-elected.
Parris Chang is a Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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