President Chen Shui-bian's (
The first is that the peace referendum is simply a way to win more votes in the presidential election. But if this is the case, then there will be no following-up on the referendum after the presidential election is over, since there will be no more concern for winning the election, and following up on the referendum would then be superfluous.
The second point is that holding the peace referendum is only an attempt at manipulating public opinion in order to expand the government's ability to set the political agenda. But this point is contrary to the traditional criticism that the political elite is shirking political responsibility. Both these criticisms are thus logically flawed.
The dust of the international dispute following the decision on the peace referendum questions has settled.
This incident, however, has revealed two issues that should be given attention when considering security in the Taiwan Strait: understanding what maintaining the status quo means and with whom the power to interpret that meaning lies; and the impact of Taiwan's democratization on the US-China-Taiwan relationship.
The US, China and Taiwan are still trying to adapt their different understandings of what the status quo entails to the new reality of Taiwanese democracy. The three parties have used the dispute incited by the peace referendum to communicate their ideas concerning these issues. Although short-term disputes may lead to setbacks, they are in fact beneficial to the long-term stability of relationships. In this sense, the peace referendum should help establish further trust between the three parties.
The current criticism that the peace referendum is illegal, that it creates cross-strait tensions and that it affects mutual trust between the US and Taiwan is in fact mixing up the issue of legitimacy arising out of different understandings of the status quo with the issue of legality arising out of the question of whether there is a legal basis for holding a referendum. This mix-up implies that the critics have no intention of dealing with the habitual neglect of the issue of Taiwan's democracy that has existed in the US-China-Taiwan relationship in the past.
Since the question of whether the referendum is appropriate will and should be answered through public participation, we cannot let politicians renounce it based on their own legal interpretations and electoral considerations.
Even though the meaning of the two referendum questions needs to be clarified, there is ample room for political discussion. The missile defense referendum will in reality involve public debate on security strategies and national defense policies, and the debate over the budget, now stuck in the Ministry of Defense and the legislature, will get a higher profile, and this will help establish public awareness of national defense affairs and psychological defense.
The referendum on negotiations based on equality will in reality place the people on the front lines of cross-strait policy and national positioning. Since the final decision rests with the public, the result of the referendum will set the scope of future cross-strait negotiations, bring transparency to cross-strait affairs and separate the ethnicity issue and the national identification issue from each other.
Because the national identification issue will be dealt with through the referendum, it will gradually be separated from campaign politics, which will make room for rational discussion concerning cross-strait affairs and help deal with the ethnicity issue.
The referendum will lead to a systemization of public participation in decision-making, thus forcing the international community to face the demands of the people.
The experience and results of the referendum will set an example for Northeast Asia, where Japan is attempting to amend its constitution through a referendum and South Korea is facing the difficulties of a minority government.
For Southeast Asian nations faced with a regressing democracy, Taiwan's use of the referendum to solve the government's efficiency problems attached to democratic governance will be an important experience to learn from. These factors are all positive for the progress of democracy in Southeast Asia and for promoting Taiwan's international standing.
For those who are fed up with the war between the pan-green and pan-blue camps, the peace referendum will give undecided voters a channel for participating in public policy issues outside of the presidential election.
Some therefore want the presidential candidates to offer some "beef," while others want to block the politically beef-laden peace referendum because they believe it will affect the presidential election. The contradiction inherent in this kind of logic is incomprehensible.
Let us return to the basics of the referendum issue and use this, our first, opportunity to hold a referendum to engage in meaningful social debate.
Lai I-chung is the director of foreign policy studies at the Taiwan Thinktank.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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