If diplomacy really is "the art of saying `nice doggie' while looking for a stick," then "diplomacy" is what the US' top diplomats have been practicing on China for the past two weeks.
When he was in Beijing two weeks ago, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was complimenting China on how nice it was.
When asked who was to blame for tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Armitage demurred, saying "You would be putting me on the side of saying that the tensions are only raised by China, and I'm not going to be in that position."
Armitage added that "The question of Taiwan has been handled sensitively and sensibly" by both Beijing and Washington over the past 25 years -- a judgment that is most definitely in the "nice doggie" category.
Armitage's statements also evinced some suspicion about the upcoming referendum which protests China's missiles and calls for government-to-government dialogue with Beijing. Prodded by his Chinese hosts, who are dead-set against any "referendum" (even to establish a Taiwan National Dog-Catching Day), Armitage offered the novel theoretical observation that "referenda are generally reserved for items or issues that are either very divisive, or very difficult," and, because the wording of Taiwan's referendum "seems to be neither divisive nor difficult," he thought there might be some "questions about the motives of those who want to put it forward."
Another "nice doggie" moment.
But it seems the administration of US President George W. Bush is also looking for a stick -- a big stick. On Feb. 6, Armitage's protege, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver, and his Pentagon counterpart, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, testified together at a congressionally-mandated hearing.
One administration official advised me to pay close attention to what both men said because "they were coordinated."
I did pay close attention, and I am certain that the Chinese embassy paid close attention and is perturbed -- because the two men's comments reflect a new coherence in the Pentagon and the State Department's China policies, which had thus far been invisible to the unaided eye.
Lawless and Schriver's testimony would explain why China's official emissary on the "Taiwan Problem," Chen Yunlin (
Testifying about the Defense Department's perspective on the Taiwan issue, Lawless not only explained that US law, specifically the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 , requires the US to give full defense support to Taiwan, but pointed out that this is simply "good policy." He explained that the Bush administration sees "the protection of freedom and democracy as a national security objective of the United States."
Moreover, he asserted that "Taiwan's development into a true multi-party democracy over the past decade has strengthened America's commitment to its defense."
"The preservation of Taiwan's democracy depends," he said, on "providing Taipei the support it needs to deter [Chinese] coercion."
And for the first time in public, Lawless revealed that US military cooperation with Taiwan has gone well beyond simply providing "defense articles and services" and now includes "supporting Taiwan in developing an integrated national security strategy; joint doctrine; and integrated capabilities for training, employing and sustaining joint forces."
Moreover, he added, this has been going on since 1997, though Pentagon officials admit that the pace of the US' direct involvement in Taiwan's war planning stepped up significantly in April 2001, shortly after the infamous "Hainan Incident" in which a US reconnaissance craft was forced to land in Hainan and its crew was held hostage for nearly two weeks.
Lawless also asserted, in another first by a Bush administration official, that "[China's] ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over Beijing's declared preference for resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful means."
This, one administration official told me, was an indirect response to comments a senior Chinese general made in New York on Jan. 15 reiterating that China would use force "if the Taiwan authorities reject sine die a peaceful solution of the cross-strait reunification issue through negotiations."
It also heralds a change in US Secretary of State Colin Powell's thus-far agnostic stance that "whether China chooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan will tell us a great deal about the kind of role China seeks with its neighbors and seeks with us." Both State and Defense are now beginning to draw their inferences from China's military buildup.
In another tantalizing comment, Lawless disclosed that "although several other states quietly collaborate with Taipei on security matters, the United States stands alone in its political courage, strategic imperative and sense of moral responsibility in assisting the security of Taiwan's democracy."
But some of those countries may also be interested in supporting Taiwan even more. Lawless advised Taiwan to "enhance interoperability ... with the United States and other potential security partners."
Indeed, the US has already achieved a strong tactical interoperability with Taiwan's defense command over the past year. And defense journals regularly report on the cooperation in intelligence collection between Taipei and Washington, which has been stepped up in recent years.
The US has its own views on the substance of the referendum. "We think [China's] missile threat is extremely serious, and we've been engaged with our Taiwan interlocutors on the nature of the threat and what needs to be done to address it." Schriver called for "leadership" in Taiwan to "convince the public that it's necessary to expend the resources to meet the challenge."
He admitted that he didn't know "whether a referendum necessarily helps or hurts" but, as if to contradict his earlier suspicions, he acknowledged that Taiwan's leaders must make decisions about resources which are "always difficult in periods of economic challenge."
Schriver acknowledged that the first question of the Taiwan referendum is indeed "very divisive" and "very difficult." Certainly he would welcome the "leadership" of Taiwan's president in "focusing the people on the necessity for a sufficient defense budget."
Despite Washington's suspicions about the motives for Taiwan's referendum, Schriver praised referendums as valuable "tools of democracy."
Yet he was surprisingly explicit, given the recent controversy within the US government about the March 20 referendum: "It's also important to note that irrespective of a referendum, we have opinions about these two questions."
Should Taiwan focus a "public consensus" on devoting more resources to face the missile threat?
"We think that's an absolute `Yes,'" Schriver said.
Should Taiwan engage in government-to-government talks with China without preconditions?
Schriver said, "Absolutely."
Those conversant in the arcana of the US' Taiwan policy will note that Schriver listed most of former US president Ronald Reagan's `Six Assurances' to Taiwan: "our one China's policy" alongside the "three communiques," the "Taiwan Relations Act," the US' insistence that differences between Taiwan and China "be resolved peacefully" and "our non-support for Taiwan independence."
The cognoscenti will readily remember that Reagan's assurances explicitly eschew recognition of China's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan despite "our non-support" for the nation's independence.
Some argue that growing discomfort on Capitol Hill and among the administration's staunch supporters in the conservative movement has caused the White House to tack to the wind, but am assured this is not so.
All along, the administration's strategy has been to keep at bay China's increasing hysteria about the progress of democracy in Taiwan with reassuring words that the US does not support "Taiwan independence," while at the same time working closely, and heretofore quietly, with Taiwan to strengthen its defenses against unwanted unification with China.
So, faced with growling Pekinese, the Bush administration says "Nice doggies, we're concerned about Taiwan's referendum too, yes we are!"
And now, for the first time, we see the administration visibly assembling an arsenal of sticks.
John Tkacik, Jr. is a research fellow at the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation in Washington.
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