Mon, Dec 29, 2003 page8

• The pillars of the US' Taiwan policy

  • By Nat Bellocchi 白樂崎
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  The present US administration says its policy on cross-strait relations is based on the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). As a demonstration of how unbalanced US policy was in the past, the current inclusion of the TRA with the three communiques is a step forward for those of us who suffered its omission for so many years. (The six assurances, one hopes, will one day also be included).

  So much for greater clarity. Under that broad cover, the US insists on a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue, and encourages dialogue between the two sides of the Strait. It opposes provocations (mostly on the part of Taiwan, it's an easier target), and any movement toward independence (only by Taiwan, but otherwise it is opaque). Most importantly, the US now places greatest emphasis on maintaining the status quo and opposing any unilateral change to it.

  Under that cover, clarity becomes somewhat diluted. An insistence on a peaceful resolution, for example, is clear and supported on all sides. That is if we are talking about a military attack. According to press reports, the US has made clear to China that any military attack or coercion will inevitably "involve" the US. Coercion, however, is a bit more complicated and not easily handled by the US.

  Encouraging a dialogue between China and Taiwan is a good objective most would agree with. Unfortunately, China does not agree, unless of course results favorable to them are guaranteed. In any event, American efforts to interfere in Taiwan's moves toward a more distinct entity of its own, or in strengthening its democratic political system, even with no more a purpose than to lower tensions, undermines the pressure on China to talk.

  Opposition to provocations is normally thought to include both sides of the Strait. Realistically, however, it falls mainly on Taiwan. China defines provocative actions by Taiwan very broadly. Now increasingly this includes domestic political changes in Taiwan that are fundamental to democratic principles. Taiwan just recently began to publicly evoke charges that China's missile deployments are provocative. While Washington sees this mostly as an election campaign gimmick, it also has a purpose in alerting the Taiwanese public to threats they have tended to ignore.

  More recently, under pressure from China, the US has stated its opposition to any movements toward independence by Taiwan. This came at a time when Taiwan was legislating the use of referendums.

  Aside from this position held by China, trying to judge what constitutes a "movement toward independence" is hardly clear. China, for example, will consider any referendum or changes to Taiwan's constitution as provocative. In principle, that should be unacceptable to the US. It appears to be a policy that could cause problems for the US, and Taiwan as well.

  We have been told on several occasions that one of the pillars of US policy regarding the cross-strait issue is that there must be no unilateral change to the status quo.

  Status quo, according to the dictionary, means "the existing state or condition" (Random House), or "the state in which anything is" (Webster). The state in which we find the broad issue of cross-strait relations is awesome. Here are some of the elements of today's status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

  The sovereignty of Taiwan is claimed by China; that claim is accepted by many countries in the world at China's behest; Japan, which has a critical interest in the Taiwan Strait, avoids addressing the issue; the US is unable to accept China's claim as the Congress would not permit it; a few small countries recognize Taiwan's sovereignty; and many if not most in Taiwan believe Taiwan already has it.

  Taiwan is a democracy that has elected leaders which gives them unqualified legitimacy; it is the 14th largest trader in the world; has a foreign exchange reserve that is one of the largest in the world; and has an economy that is internationalized but also one of the largest foreign investors in China. At the same time, China's continuing and vigorous effort to isolate Taiwan results in most international organizations, including financial ones, rejecting Taiwan's membership, even as an observer.

  The state of affairs on Taiwan includes a gradual defining of its own identity. Politically, it has not only irreversibly become a democracy, but chosen a direct type of democracy that puts it even further removed from the political system in China.

  Then there is the state of Taiwan's capability to defend itself. As China modernizes its military, putting top priority on a credible capability to defeat Taiwan before the US could intervene, Taiwan (and the US to the extent it must implement the Taiwan Relations Act) seeks ways to offset that threat. China keeps open its threat to attack or coerce Taiwan, including among many other things, almost 500 missiles aimed at Taiwan.

  So the main pillar of America's policy on cross-strait issues is maintaining the status quo. China supports this, as was demonstrated in Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's (溫家寶) visit to Washington. Indeed, China has good reason to support this position. Under the status quo, China can continue to expand its missile deployment opposite Taiwan, continue to block Taiwan's participation in international institutions and have its definition of what is provocative accepted.

  Taiwan, on the other hand, while it gets critical help from the US in offsetting China's military threat, and some limited support in its effort to participate in the international community, must otherwise largely work alone to strengthen its ability to prevent a unification that the majority of the people do not want. What it can do on its own is to demonstrate its democratic progress and expand its grassroots effort to establish a national identity. China-determined provocations try to undermine this.

  America's purpose in maintaining the status quo is to block unilateral efforts to attain either unification or independence from erupting into war. It is seldom put this way, which is unfortunate as it would be better understood. It is the management of the many unresolved issues under that more clearly defined status quo, however, that will continue to be difficult for America, and favor China.

  Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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