The first two speeches by Tai-wanese presidents in the US speak much for how different the US-Taiwan relationship has become in the eight years between them. In that time the US has come to accept that a democratic Taiwan exists and accepts that the relationship should be managed in a different way than in the past. It has become more complicated even now, though the offshoot of democracy -- the legitimacy of its government and leadership -- is still to be addressed.
In 1994 tensions between the US and Taiwan arose over a request for then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) to transit the US en route to Central America. Much, but not all, has been written about that episode, but the results left both sides unhappy. This was followed the next year by a resurrection of a request from Cornell for a Lee visit. The State Department stonewalled the request while Taiwan gained overwhelming Congressional and media support, resulting in a Taiwanese victory and an unhappy State Department. There was much more to that, of course, but the point here was that the relationship was not at its best.
Most of Lee's speech at Cornell had to do with Taiwan's economic accomplishments, and its democratization. Two paragraphs mentioned a hope for good relations with China, and many more were about his past at Cornell and gratitude for America's support. The speech was immediately denounced by the State Department as "too political," apparently because of his frequent use of "The Republic of China on Taiwan."
That assessment was not shared by the rest of the executive branch. It may be improper for American diplomats to refer to that title for diplomatic reasons, but the president of that country?
From then to the year 2000, the relationship was choppy but at least manageable. The election of that year finally made it clear that Taiwan was indeed a democracy and further that this made it necessary to conduct the relationship with that in mind. These last few months have made it clear that dealing with a fellow democracy may be more satisfying, but also more complicated. Tensions exist that are of a different kind than in 1995.
Nonetheless, transit restrictions for Taiwan's president have considerably loosened. There may have been anxiety in some parts of the US government for the most recent trip, with Taiwanese politics and sensitive democratic reform in mind, but quiet diplomacy and common sense seems to have prevailed. President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) spent two days in New York City, made a speech and met with many people, and then went on to Panama. Ironically, this kind of arrangement was a possible compromise option that the US did not wish to purse in 1995 though it could also have considerably lessened China's embarrassment in failing to stop a "visit" rather than a "transit" by Lee.
Chen's speech itself was even less "political" than the speech in 1995 (there was no reference in the written speech to "The Republic of China," but there were countless references to "Taiwan"). There were no references to cross-strait relations, and only some mild adlibbing at the end of his speech on the Chinese demon-strations outside the hotel. It would be stretching it even more than in 1995 if anyone considered the speech "too political."
The results of the two-day visit to New York was a success for both sides and seems to have lessened the tensions that existed in the recent past. There is, however, four months before the election. The closeness of the race, and the many fragile issues that could at any time sprout crisis of one kind or another -- domestically, with a China that could interfere overtly or covertly, or even with the US with its many difficult regional issues to address, could quickly change this atmosphere.
And all this deals with the coming election only. The difficult internal struggle over national identity will be affected by the election, but to what degree and in what direction will depend on the result.
The continuing debate within Taiwan in any event will continue to be lively. China, as in the forthcoming election, will want to influence the direction the debate will go, and could well, as it does now despite its lack of success, press for support from the US. Tensions in cross-strait relations may yet again cause the kind of anxiety we witnessed recently before objectives became clearer and the likely results better understood.
And beyond this remains how best to address the legitimacy of the government and leaders elected openly and legally by the people of Taiwan. We have come to be comfortable in seeing these two issues -- Taiwan's national identity and its legitimacy -- as likely not to be ready for decision until well into the future. The acceptance of "status quo," despite the continuous changes that occur in reality, up to now has sufficed.
Perhaps that will continue as now for some time, as the issues will be as difficult to resolve as they have been for many years. But as the confidence in the democratic process grows, and the people's voice is heard on these more fundamental issues, the pressures on the three governments relevant to the cross-strait relationships will become greater.
The restrictions on communicating with Taiwan which Washington put on itself in the past are now counterproductive and do not allow discussions (and understanding) on differing interests that inevitably will develop, before tensions rise too high. The present channels of communications are not sufficient, at the level that matters, to deal with the delicate but very important issues relating to the future of Taiwan that still lie ahead.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chair-man of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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