The debate over the referendum law reached another climax with the approval of the DPP and TSU's version of the draft law on Wednesday. Despite conveying the impression of an unprecedented consensus on the public's right to a referendum, the pan greens and pan blues are still poles apart in terms of what that right entails.
A comparison of the two versions of the draft submitted by the DPP-TSU camp and the KMT-PFP camp reveals that the pan blues are much more restrictive in several critical aspects. For one, the draft severely limits the permissible subject matters of the referendums, excluding the changing of the national flag and country name, as well as military, social welfare and national security issues. Under these circumstances, no wonder some people have jokingly asked, "What is left?"
Another major difference is the minimum number of signatures required to petition for the calling of a national referendum. The minimum ask by the DPP and TSU is 2 percent of all eligible voters, while the KMT and PFP ask for a much higher figure -- 5 percent. A benefit of this higher percentage is that frivolous issues not of national concern can be screened out in the process, so as to avoid wasting time and money. It should not be forgotten that the people of Taiwan have a feverish enthusiasm for political participation, making political mobilization in this small nation easier to begin with, and that a large number of the population hold a particular political party affiliation or loyalty. Put together, these make obtaining the minimum number of signatures less difficult than elsewhere in the world.
An even more noteworthy difference in the two drafts of the law is this -- the DPP-TSU version accords the Executive Yuan the right to initiate referendums, while the KMT-PFP version does not. According to Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), putting this sort of responsibility in the hands of the Cabinet disrupts the balance of power between the executive and legislative branch.
The problem is, in most other countries where people's referendum rights are acknowledged, both the people and the government have initiative rights. Now if the DPP-TSU version gave the government exclusive initiative rights, then Ma's accusation that the public's rights are being encroached would make sense. However, the pan greens are actually seeking an additional channel through which referendums may be called or initiated.
Reportedly, Ma claims that the DPP-TSU draft would allow the Executive Yuan to call for a referendum with the approval of a majority of the votes caste in the Legislative Yuan, while currently the Constitution mandates that the Legislative Yuan may override a veto by the Cabinet if it is backed by a majority of lawmakers.
Ma's fear seems to be that the lower threshold for approval by the Legislative Yuan for holding a referendum could cause the Executive Yuan to resort to referendums each time it seeks to veto a law passed by the legislature. This scenario is, of course, a grave concern for the pan blues, which continue to enjoy a legislative majority and have consistently used that majority to hobble the government's policy implementation.
Executive Yuan Spokesperson Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) has denied that a lower threshold is provided for in the draft version approved by the Executive Yuan. The two camps will have to offer additional clarifications on this point before meaningful debate can continue.
Finally, it should not be forgotten there is no higher threshold than the approval by a majority of voters once an issue is put to vote through a referendum. Moreover, unless it has no regard for its own political accountability and credibility, the Executive Yuan would not randomly call referendums without due cause. Ma should have no cause for concern.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,