Thu, Oct 30, 2003 page8

• Democratization and foreign policy

  • By Nat Bellocchi 白樂崎
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  At this time, in East Asia, the US leadership is focusing its efforts on the North Korean nuclear problem, and now increasingly on the potential for terrorist activity in Southeast Asia. The former especially means working closely with China. In the Taiwan Strait, the US continues to work for a peaceful resolution of that issue. It also wants democracy to prevail. The first part is made very clear and supported with decisions on arms sales and cooperation in the security field. The second one gets more lip service than action, but it is admittedly a pretty difficult objective to deal with.

  When a recognized state changes from an authoritarian regime to a democratic government, peacefully or otherwise, it requires much time before it becomes reasonably stabilized. It is never easy, and will never be complete.

  Under normal circumstances countries that have gone through this change to democratization are recognized sovereign entities. Names may change, systems may change, but sovereignty remains. Taiwan's democratization, alas, is not a normal circumstance -- it carries an extra burden of being a contested sovereignty.

  In 1979, the US switched recognition (but not sovereignty) to a China that insists sovereignty over Taiwan is theirs as well. To many in America at that time, accepting the Chinese position was worth gaining a stronger relationship with an important country. Many did not agree, however, and the Taiwan Relations Act, until this day, has made it very difficult to change. In addition, democratization of Taiwan greatly expanded the number of Americans that support the latter view.

  Ironically, though the US strongly supported the change to democracy, it took the evolution of that system in Taiwan a decade before the meaning of this change with regard to the US-Taiwan relationship began to be under-stood. That came with the peaceful transition of government that occurred in 2000. Throughout the two decades of the "unofficial" relationship, the 1980s and 1990s, the fundamental understanding between the US and Taiwan, was that Taiwan should maintain a "low profile" externally to prevent tensions with China.

  There were important practical reasons for this, well understood by both, and manageable by Taiwan. Manageable, that is, under an authoritarian regime but not so manageable with democratization.

  Increasingly the low-profile strategy, as far back as the 1990s, began to be seen differently by many in Taiwan. It was seen as being advantageous to China, but weakening Taiwan's ability to maintain a separate existence. High profile was for the Taiwanese a logical way for Taiwan to remind the world of its legitimacy and that it existed separately from China. So it seems that the "low profile" underpinning of the US-Taiwan relationship has become simply impractical. It can't be put back into the bottle.

  The PRC is given credit these days for understanding that high-profile threats, or even unfriendly statements against Taiwan, are counterproductive to their objective in making Taiwan a province of China. It took them some time to grasp this reality. But it seems unclear to Beijing's leaders even now just what should be done about their previously strong hold on what they think should be considered provocations. Now, with a robust and important but not formally recognized economic relationship with Taiwan, it is getting more difficult. Higher tensions in the cross-strait relationship would not be helpful for them either.

  Taiwan seems to have learned how to use the provocation method themselves. Taiwan's democratic openness and the inevitable campaign rhetoric that goes with it gives the government a better plat-form to complain about provocative behavior from China. Perhaps even more important, it is challenging Beijing's habit of defining any changes made in Taiwan's domestic affairs as provocative and a matter of China's internal affairs.

  In the present circumstances, the US leadership has placed its highest priority in East Asia on the North Korean problem, which includes working closely with China. Taiwan's leaders see the preoccupations China now has -- North Korea externally, and its domestic situation requiring almost total attention to the economy and maintaining stability during this period of rapid and widespread reform -- as an opportunity. This may not only boost the government's chances in next March's election, but allow the needed but sensitive reform in the government structure to be addressed.

  In Taipei, as in Washington, important but sensitive policies are worked out by a limited number of people, and approved by the president. But in both places, the timing for revealing the policy to the public is the president's prerogative, which means that even the small number in the know are sometimes surprised. That's more manageable with domestic policies, but not so manageable if it impacts on foreign relations.

  While many attribute any statements made by a candidate in an upcoming election as pure politics and nothing more, the experience of the last three years suggests that progress on almost all issues -- economic, welfare, education, corruption and cross-strait relations -- cannot move forward under the present political structure.

  The need for constitutional change is clear if permanent gridlock in running the country is to be avoided. The debate is over the degree of change, and in what direction, but not that change in the constitution should not take place.

  Likewise, trying to address an individual issue that is contested in the legislature, without the president, for example, having the power of veto, leaves no other choice but to find some legal means of getting around the legislative roadblock. A referendum, whatever aspects of it that can be politically motivated and sensitive with regard to cross-strait relations, does legally provide a means of doing so. The debate is doing so constructively and avoiding the sensitivities, not that there should be no referendums.

  National identity is another sensitive issue in Taiwan. It is not new. It has been present in every election that has taken place since democratization, through direct elections, began. What is different is that it has become much more openly expressed. That is not going to go away. On the contrary, it will grow with every election, and likely more aggressively. The youn-ger generation, rapidly moving toward being a majority of voters and confident that they can express themselves in any way they wish, for the most part take a separate identity for granted. The lack of consensus on this issue is an albatross for any administration. It is not that it shouldn't be addressed, but in what way.

  So, for Taiwan and the US, the challenge is how to avoid "throwing the baby out with the bathwater" -- that is overdoing what to try politically in light of important sensitivities on the one side, while not overreacting to legitimate reform in the democratic process on the other.

  Full and unfettered democracy in Taiwan matters in many ways, for Taiwan primarily, but for the broader objectives of the US and the region. Clearly, a means for the leadership in both countries to permit more direct communications between them has become increasingly necessary.

  Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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