Taiwan doesn't seem to be afraid of spacemen, but it should be.
This nation should be concerned about China's heavy investment in its space program and the implied strategic changes the program's progress entails for cross-strait security.
China did not send a man into space just to drum up nationalist sentiment by putting the "first ethnic Chinese" into space. Indeed, that honor went to Taylor Wang (
ILLUSTRATION: YU SHA
Regardless of the media frenzy surrounding China's first manned mission to space, and without detracting from the undoubted courage of Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei (
But aside from the commercial advantages such an enterprise is expected to bring, Beijing's first manned space flight was also a highly visible indication of the strategic direction in which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is moving.
Unless future taikonauts have to fight their way out of "hostile territory" after their space flight with the knives and pistols they reportedly carry, the flights will have little direct military utility. Sending someone into space for a brief jaunt around the globe hardly qualifies as a strategic sea-change.
Nevertheless, the point is that China has been expanding its military capabilities in space, and shows no intention of decreasing attention on the issue for many years to come.
In short, China is showing a great deal of foresight regarding military policy-making, while Taiwan's military is struggling to adapt to the radical changes that have occurred over the past decade or so in the nature of modern warfare. This disparity in strategic flexibility worries many security analysts.
"For those of us who love Taiwan, it's very disheartening that [the Chinese space program] is not being taken seriously," said a senior US defense official, who asked not to be named.
Why should Beijing's space odyssey concern Taiwan? It comes down to the strategic importance of a rather cumbersome abbreviation: C4ISR, or command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
The world's most advanced military, the US military, enjoys its reputation for "total battlefield dominance" in conventional warfare in large part to the US' advanced C4ISR capabilities. What this means in real terms is that the ability of battlefield commanders to achieve an accurate picture of the nature and disposition of enemy forces is what allows the US to, as one Marine Corps general explained during the campaign in Afghanistan, "eviscerate enemy forces." An important component of the US C4ISR infrastructure is space-based assets, ie, satellites.
China, through close observation of the 1991 Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign and one would assume Afghanistan and the US-led invasion of Iraq, has learned that without a great deal of technological advancement, the PLA is simply outclassed by modern military standards.
China has therefore embarked on an ambitious program of transformation for the PLA. It has begun to move away from the massive and outdated model of maintaining a giant but poorly equipped military to a comparatively lighter force structure with a greater emphasis on advanced weapons systems.
The Chinese military has begun to focus on non-traditional warfare techniques such as information warfare and asymmetrical tactics, acquire "fourth-generation" advanced fighter aircraft from Russia, expand its missile forces and develop special operations units. It has also made significant progress with an anti-satellite warfare program designed to disrupt its opponent's C4ISR capabilities, while simultaneously expanding its own command and control abilities.
As part of this effort to transform the PLA, China is focusing a disproportionate amount of resources on the space-based infrastructure necessary for advanced C4ISR capabilities, by developing increasingly sophisticated satellite-delivery platforms and hardware.
If China's progress with its space program continues as it has, its "manned space efforts almost certainly will contribute to improved military space systems in the 2010 to 2020 timeframe," according to the US Department of Defense's annual report to Congress on strategic developments concerning China.
While China is racing ahead and embracing the American concept of RMA, or a revolution in military affairs, Taiwan seems to be stuck in the past, organizing its forces as though it were still expecting a "Normandy-style invasion" by the PLA.
The US Defense Department's report repeatedly called Taiwan's fixation on counter-landing operations a significant inadequacy.
Although the "military has been seeking to address several deficiencies," including an "opaque military policy-making system, a ground force-centric orientation; and a conservative military leadership culture," the army still has "major shortcomings as a fighting force," the report said.
"The counter-landing focus ... remains largely unchanged," the report said.
In its summation of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, the report added an ominous warning for Taiwan about the possibility of Chinese military action commencing with an operation designed to maximize strategic surprise.
"A surprise missile and air strike on Taiwan most likely would damage severely most of Taiwan's air bases, significantly degrading its land-based air defenses, C4ISR systems, and ability to generate sorties in the absence of Taiwan efforts to harden facilities and increase redundancy," the report said.
"Concurrently, the PLAN [Chinese navy] also could attack major Taiwan surface combatants with minimal warning," it said. "If the PLA effectively incorporates these concepts into its doctrine, Taiwan could become increasingly vulnerable to strategic and operational-level surprise."
Most observers agree that current political conditions are such that Beijing is unlikely to launch a surprise attack against Taiwan. But some analysts question the wisdom of Taiwan's apparent desire to rely on Beijing's magnanimity.
Changing social and economic conditions in China, as well as other developments in regional security -- such as the eventuality of an East Asian arms race beginning were North Korea to successfully test-detonate a nuclear bomb -- could dramatically alter the region's political landscape. Were a less-accommodating Chinese leadership to come into power, the precariousness of Taiwan's position would be clear.
"It takes only seven minutes for a fighter jet to cross the Taiwan Strait. Taipei could be bombed so quickly that the pilots would be back in China in time for breakfast and then another run," said Wendell Minnick, a Taipei-based military affairs specialist who writes for Jane's Defence Weekly.
One of the ways to counter this vulnerability is to develop Taiwan's C4ISR capabilities. But Taiwan has shown a rather uneven approach in this regard, especially to some of the more advanced applications of recent C4ISR technological advancements. Some analysts think Taiwan has completely lost interest in the military utility of a space program.
"It isn't that Taiwan doesn't have the capability" to conduct it's own space program and expand its strategic capabilities through the use of advanced C4ISR equipment, the US defense official said on a recent visit to Taiwan.
"Taiwan just doesn't have the political desire to do anything in space," he said.
Taiwan's attitude toward the strategic implications of Beijing's space program simply reflected the endemic shortsightedness of Taiwan's approach to the threat from China, Minnick said.
"Taiwan loves flashy sophisticated weaponry. It took a lot for the US Defense Department to push Taiwan into purchasing a C4ISR program and it is getting just as hard to push them on early warning radar," he said. "There are many who believe that Taiwan wants to look tough, with lots of muscles, but no brains."
Advancements in C4ISR capabilities aren't something you can point to, like a tank or an airplane, so for a long time the Ministry of National Defense was reluctant to spend money on it, Minnick said.
"Taiwan's military usually doesn't want to invest in anything that can't be seen," he said. "It's almost as though some politicians and defense officials think that Taiwan's military is just for show."
However, that attitude was beginning to change, Minnick said. He cited the Po Sheng, or "Broad Victory" program in which Taiwan may invest up to US$2.1 billion on C4ISR upgrades as an example of progress.
Another important advancement was the recently completed upgrade of Taiwan's SIGINT, or signals intelligence, facilities that enhances Taiwan's ability to intercept radio communications from China.
But Minnick said that overall, the cross-strait strategic balance was increasingly in China's favor.
"China can always point to Taiwan's Kidd-class destroyers and hundreds of fighter jets and say `We can't attack Taiwan with that kind of defense,' but it's just an excuse not to do anything. The reality is Taiwan would be a pushover. New US Department of Defense estimates are five to seven days for the PRC to take Taiwan," Minnick said.
"There wouldn't even be time to flirt," he added.
Mac William Bishop, a former US Marine, is a political commentator based in Taipei
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