Secretary-general of the Presi-dential Office Chiou I-jen (邱義仁) recently gave an explanation for President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) proposal for a new constitution, pointing out that among the 175 articles in the Constitution, as many as 116 articles, or 65 percent, need to be amended.
Amendments on such a massive scale could of course be depicted as writing an entirely new constitution. However, Chu's explanation is not concise enough. A more precise explanation is as follows: A five-branch government supposedly exists under the Constitution. The Constitution differs not only from other constitutions that tend to regulate three-branch governments, but also from the original Constitution drafted by Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙).
Despite extensive amendments that were made following compromise after compromise, the Constitution remains the source of much chaos within the central government. Therefore it should be amended to a constitution with a more efficient three-branch government. Since the amendments entail fundamental structural and conceptual changes, the resulting product should of course be referred to as a new constitution.
The inefficiency of the government is due primarily to three factors: the inability of legislative representatives to voice and reflect the popular will; the inability to resolve conflicts between the legislative and executive branches of the government in a rational manner; and the confusing division of executive powers between the president and the premier.
The only way out is to write a new framework for the Constitution to deal with these problems and improve the government's efficiency.
Representative political participation is often inadequate in reflecting the majority view. Elected officials are supposed to represent the views of the voters in their voting districts when they participate in legislative decisions.
However, after an election, it is difficult for the voters to control the behavior of their representatives and lawmakers or elected officials who often vote or propose bills based on their own views, rather than those of the voters.
Better legislative representatives may give some thought to national interests. Others base their votes on the interests of their political parties or factions, seriously diverging from the real popular will. Such conduct has become commonplace in this country.
The current electoral system, under which each district elects multiple seats, have prompted legislative representatives to represent only small minorities within their districts. Exactly who and where are these voters are, not even the representatives seem to know. So, with very few exceptions, lawmakers can easily ignore the will of the voters. Under the circumstances, democracy sometimes makes it possible for lawmakers to act as they please.
Even when the lawmakers can accurately reflect the views of the voters, the legislative majority does not always reflect the views of the majority of the voters. For example, if every district elects only one representative, then whoever is elected may have won only slightly more than 50 percent of the votes. This means that half of all the lawmakers may represent only a quarter of the voters. The so-called congressional majority, theoretically, does not always represent the majority view.
This is without taking into account the backdrop of party politics. Even if every political party adopts a democratic deci-sionmaking process, a little more than half of the party's lawmakers could decide how all of the party's lawmakers should vote. In the end, the so-called legislative majority represents only one-eighth of the voters, straying even further from the real popular will.
If political parties do not operate in a democratic manner, and a couple of parties bond into a larger group, or if a small minority of people or even one single person monopolizes power within an authoritarian party, the legislative majority would drift still further from the will of the people.
These flaws have led many countries to use mechanisms such as referendums and initiative rights. This is why Taiwan is contemplating referendums. However, referendums also have serious flaws, such as a lack of consistency in policymaking.
A major contribution of the Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow was proving that policies made by a majority vote results in a contradictory outcome every time. For example, if referendums were held simultaneously on issues A, B and C, B could win. But if the choice is only between A and C, C might win. Therefore it is difficult to detect what the people really want, creating much conflict about policies. The best way of resolving such conflicts is with a three-branch and presidential form of government.
Under the presidential form of government, the legislative branch is responsible for drafting applicable general policies for the long term, which are the laws of the country. Since laws are applied on a long-term basis once enacted, the legislative representatives are less likely to be manipulated by individuals or a small minority. As for policies that may involve short-term interests, they are left up to the executive branch, which is led by the president, giving policy implementation more consistency and efficiency.
Let us use the US as an example. If the president felt that a congressional decision is inappropriate, he or she can veto the bill. If both the Senate and the House of Representatives pass the bill with a two-thirds majority, then the president must accept their decision. However, when more than two-thirds of the members of both houses hold a different opinion, the president gets to call the shots.
This design could avoid the shortcomings of representative politics and set clear boundaries for the division of power between the president and Congress, allowing the two powers to check and balance each other. It is indeed a worthy example.
In contrast, a small number of lawmakers in the Legislative Yuan can interfere with the operation of executive power. Some of them could even deliberately paralyze the government as part of party bickering and rivalry.
Under the circumstances, we should move toward the establishment of a presidential form of government, so that the central government can reflect the real popular will, as well as attain
efficiency.
In addition, the current "co-habitation" form of government is another source of chaos. The premier is appointed by the president, which of course means that the president has the power to command the premier. However, because the Constitution had been repeatedly amended, blurring the original intent, some people often argue that the president should not be allowed to interfere with policy implementation, creating difficulties for the Executive Yuan as well as for the Presidential Office.
From this perspective, a new constitution that clearly adopts the presidential form of government is needed. The Constitution should not be allowed to continue in its fragmented condition.
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