One element for the campaign for next March's presidential election, is shaping up as being pretty familiar. The candidates and parties make clear promises on domestic issues that are difficult to implement, and remain largely unclear where they will take the country on external issues. That reads very much like what presidential candidates face in any democracy.
In my last article, the focus was on the importance of the election's outcome to the US and other countries, and the possibility of needing a review of strategy. Given the importance to the US of its relationship with Taiwan with regard to both China and East Asia security, Americans in particular should also better know why the result of the voting is still so uncertain and will likely be very close, and why that should matter.
Historically the two sides in Taiwan have geographical areas that tend to favor one side or the other. Presumably this is still valid. Taiwan's "south" is generally conceded to be Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) turf. This area encompasses about 30 percent of all the voters. North of this, more populous and with a much larger number of "mainlanders" and civil servants, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has had a majority in the past, although there are times when some districts have voted for the DPP.
There are, however, some important constituencies that are not a part of any political parties.
One, well over a million new voters are expected to cast a ballot for the first time. Both sides claim they have a majority of these young constituents, which means that neither side is really confident how they will vote. Employment, or lack of it, is the priority issue for many of them, given the high unemployment rate.
Their perceptions of Taiwan's position in the international community and especially the relationship with China, seem to have little depth. Many take for granted Taiwan's separate existence without considering the challenge of such a policy by China. The base for their decision on who to vote for more likely will be largely what they read or see in the media or the polls, both of which are often misleading, or simply the personality they like.
Two, the Hakka community is roughly thought to be about 15 percent of the people, or about the same number as the mainlander community. During the later years of the KMT administration, local elections were allowed, including in the three districts in central Taiwan where the majority of Hakka live.
The majority of Hakka voters in the past have sided with the KMT (or a KMT splinter party), including during the last election. The DPP administration has made a considerable effort to expand knowledge of Hakka culture in education and cultural institutions, but it is still unclear what the impact of this attention will be in the forthcoming election.
Three, a new constituency is that part of the Taiwanese business community that either works in China or has important business relationships there. Both sides have been cultivating support from this group. The number of people as reported by media is somewhere between 500,000 to 1 million.
It is generally thought this group, or more precisely the individuals in it, will vote for the side that will best pursue the means of expanding their capability of doing business in China. It may not be so simple, however, as most have family and company ties in Taiwan, and presumably their ballots, like every voter, will be both private and opened in Taiwan.
Last month a "pan-purple alliance," made up of nine social welfare groups, largely critical of both sides at least on some issues, caught public attention at its founding. It does not seem to have captured a political following yet, but it has indicated recently that it will begin seminars next month on unemployment problems facing college students.
Another important factor is the large number of "undecided" voters that appear in some polls. Altogether, this variety of constituencies point to a very uncertain and close election. Any one of these non-partisan groups -- youth, Hakka, China business -- could be a determining factor in the final vote.
Two other factors that shape the political background are the media and the wide use of polls. That each are fraught with biases is not uncommon in countries with the kind of democracy Taiwan has. It is a difficult problem even in democracies that have existed for countless generations. With time, tradition, education and broad public debates on issues will make voters more aware of the biases, but at this time the bulk of the media and the polls are still strongly weighed on one side.
In both cases, the candidates and parties have strong base constituencies on one side or the other of the political spectrum. So the objective of both sides is to satisfy their base constituency while struggling to gain the middle ground sufficient to become a majority. The result of a defeat by either of the two main parties will have long term consequences. The balance between conservative and moderates in the DPP factions would likely change drastically, and the KMT will almost assuredly see a new generation taking over the party.
Every democracy is different of course, and few have to bear the challenge to its own sovereignty as Taiwan must do even now. The sheer diversity of the constituencies that the candidates and parties have to contend with, and the sensitivity that the country not only could lose its sovereignty but its freedom places a special responsibility on the candidates, the parties and the voters. At the same time, the uncertainties especially in light of the newer constituencies, make it very likely that the vote will be a cliff hanger.
The implications of this for China or the US is the potential, at some critical point or on some issue that at the moment is leading the concerns of the Taiwanese voters, for intervention. China seems to have learned its lesson. Its past efforts at public pressure clearly were counter productive. There are, of course, many other means to influence an election. -- like money or persuasion on those when it has some leverage on. That becomes a matter that politicians and officials have to cope with domestically in Taiwan.
For the US side, while commitments on Taiwan's security make it legitimate to make American concerns known, it is better understood that public pressure is counterproductive in an open political system such as Taiwan's, and in addition there would inevitably be domestic political costs in the US as well. Dialogue is the best way to lessen this likelihood. That, unfortunately, is rejected by China. With the US, a different kind of dialogue, outside the stringent self-imposed rules, would be the best answer. It is time, and in not only the US' or Taiwan's interest, but even China's.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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