After months of impasse and heightened tension between the US and North Korea over the latter's nuclear weapons program, six-party talks -- hosted by China and joined by officials from North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the US -- will finally begin tomorrow in Beijing.
While such a development is certainly a welcome development for the region, the path to peace will likely remain bumpy. The parties to the talks have different agendas and priorities, and reconciling them requires diplomatic acumen as well as flexibility and creativity.
Pyongyang's bottom line will be to seek regime survival by securing a non-aggression pledge from Washington which in effect would end the status of hostility between the two countries (a 50-year-old armistice signed at the end of the Korean War is looking increasingly fragile) and lead to eventual diplomatic recognition. North Korea can also be expected to demand the lifting of US sanctions. In exchange, it may offer to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in stages.
The US positions have always been that North Korea must scrap its nuclear weapons program unconditionally. Any new arrangements must be enforced via rigorous inspection and verification provisions. In return, Washington would pledge not to attack North Korea and relax curbs on economic assistance from international financial institutions, but it has ruled out Pyongyang's non-aggression pact suggestion.
China's initial reactions to the North Korean nuclear crisis were rather passive. Beijing played down the crisis and suggested that direct US-North Korean negotiations was the way to resolve the issue. However, as the crisis escalated, the Chinese step-ped up diplomatic pressure on their erstwhile ally, which is becoming a strategic liability. Beijing brokered the late-April tri-partite meeting and is widely credited with bringing all concerned to the upcoming talks.
However, China's fundamental interests remain in boosting the stability and de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As a result, it may well oppose any high-handedness at the talks and any efforts to impose sanctions on Pyongyang.
South Korean reactions and approaches to the nuclear crisis have been influenced by its desire to seek a non-military resolution of the issue and the continuance of the "Sunshine Policy" of former president Kim Dae-jung administration even though the latter has recently been tarnished by a scandal surrounding his historic meeting with Kim Jong-il. President Roh Moo-hyun government continues to stress stability, non-nuclearization and dialogue even though Seoul has shifted from an earlier call for direct US-North Korea talks to endorsement of multilateral discussions.
Tokyo's policy stand is rather ambivalent. While sensitive to Chinese and South Korean concerns about stability and supportive of a non-military resolution of the issue, the Japanese government is receptive to more stringent measures to pressure Pyongyang. Tokyo, for example, wants North Korea to join in the 11-nation Proliferation Security Initiative and supports efforts to block North Korean shipments of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Tokyo is also interested in raising at the six-party talks the issue of North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals.
Russia is interested in getting involved in any settlement of the nuclear issue and having its voice heard regarding regional affairs. It has proposed a regional security arrangement providing a security guarantee to North Korea, thus alleviating the latter's fears of attack and paving the way for it to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
The six-party talks will likely confront these multiple agendas and address divergent concerns. Clearly, none of the parties at the table would like to see war as the way to resolve the issue. But military confrontation cannot be completely ruled out. A phased, yet integrated, approach should be developed to provide stability and lay the groundwork for long-term peace on the Korean Peninsula.
The Beijing talks must achieve this minimum consensus if nothing else. That is, the parties should pledge not to escalate the crisis as long as dialogue is under way. This requires that North Korea stop further nuclear activities, including reprocessing of spent fuel rods, reactivating nuclear reactors and developing its enrichment programs.
This moratorium should be followed by negotiation of a comprehensive arrangement to verifiably dismantle North Korea's nuclear program and the resumption of heavy fuel supplies through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Any nuclear disarmament agreement must include plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, and be accompanied by stringent verification provisions enforced either by the International Atomic Energy Agency or a regional, ad hoc multilateral arrangement.
A multilateral security regime guaranteeing North Korea's security could then be developed in which the US should be a participant. Such a regime should go beyond key elements of inter-Korean arms control provisions negotiated in the early 1990s.
Conventional arms reduction along the Demilitarized Zone and its adjacent areas must also be developed to reconfigure and eventually remove the offensive posture of the military forces deployed there. Pyongyang and Washington should be encouraged to explore paths to full normal political and economic relations.
North Korea's economy is in shambles after years of natural disasters, poor economic policies and excessive militarization. The international community, in particular development assistance agencies and financial institutions (such as the UN Development Program, the Asian Development Bank and the IMF), could play a prominent role.
These are daunting tasks. There is the issue of whether North Korea can be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons program. The Iraqi experience may be a convincing case for Pyong-yang to hold on to its nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass des-truction. In addition, there will be doubts about any new negotiated deal. Pyongyang's covert nuclear enrichment programs raise serious doubts about its credibility. There also remains the possibility that North Korea will continue its programs even as it is engaged in multilateral talks.
Finally, within the US, opinions differ as to the best approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The "regime change" faction competes with the "diplomacy" school over US policy in this regard.
The stakes are very high. Hav-ing endured uncertainty, escalation and tension for more than 10 months, the parties should seize the opportunity to arrive at pragmatic solutions. Twice the region has been on the brink of war, and this third time should be seen as an opportunity to secure peace before it is too late.
Yuan Jing-dong is a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California.
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