Having gone through dramatic ups and downs in the past three years, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) must know the difference between being a presidential candidate and being the president.
Chen has been having hard times both in dealing with the global recession as well as with the opposition obstructing his administration. As an incumbent seeking reelection, Chen's campaign tours around the country never end, as he tries to sell his image to the rank and file.
Despite being an "image-is-everything politician," one of the greatest challenges Chen faces is how to translate his campaign speeches into feasible policy and how to project images of his ideas in the process.
It is therefore no surprise to see that Chen has increased his daily itinerary to far-flung locales, with the aim of strengthening his popularity and showing the voters the extent to which he has fulfilled his campaign promises. Even so, his approval rate has been lingering around 35 percent.
Three criticisms are commonly given of Chen's performance. The first argument centers on his "lack of vision" for Taiwan. As a result of this shortcoming, proponents of this view say Chen's promises have raised the art of empty rhetoric to new heights.
One of Chen's key 2000 campaign themes, "the new middle way," has rarely been mentioned by him since he took over the presidency. Instead, he has been criticized for his inability to move toward the middle of the political spectrum and embrace more moderate voters. The newly formed "pan-purple" alliance, composed of social groups of disadvantaged people, has openly challenged Chen's failure to live up to his campaign pledges.
The second argument contends that Chen's leadership resembles former US president George Bush's "read my lips" fiasco. Like Bush, Chen is a traditional politician who is willing to say anything to get elected, without giving a thought to how he might make good on his promises. As the campaign heats up, the administration has released many "policy benefits." These moves invited heavy attacks from the opposition who bills them as attempts at "policy-vote buying."
The third argument focuses mainly on the government's failure to deal with the opposition. The opposition has used every mistake made by the administration as an excuse to attack it. Although the opposition has also invited public resentment by doing this, the government has nevertheless been dragged down by the endless political squabbles.
Undeniably, the inherent structural problems embedded in this country's political landscape came graphically to light after the transfer of power. The controversy, however, centers on whether Chen focuses too much on his own image-building, rather on implementing his policies.
It is imperative for Chen to strike a balance between building his image and selling his programs in the remaining months before the election next March. It is in fact through the discussion of issues that the public learns who you really are.
Over the last decade, voters have become increasingly disgusted with the negative tone of politics, especially when they feel they have been cheated. But politicians and the media rarely understand this. Politicians often take advantage of the mistakes made by their opponents and the media only cover the most negative, simplistic, distorted and partisan rhetoric.
The public now insists that a candidate spell out his or her program, vision and ideas, before they elect him or her. Whoever can outline a workable blueprint for Taiwan shall win the next presidential election.
Chen must keep in mind the need to show the public that he is able to turn promises into reality. Most importantly, he must demonstrate the will to do so.
Liu Kuan-teh is a political commentator based in Taipei.
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