Most of the Pentagon's latest Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China to Congress, published on July 30, remains the same as last year's report. In addition to pointing out in its estimate of China's strength that Beijing has increased the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan to 450, the main difference is that it stresses that Taiwan's "will to resist" is crucial to the question of whether a Chinese attack will be successful.
The report points out that, for China's coercive strategy towards Taiwan to be successful, "perhaps the most important factor is the degree to which Taiwan's leaders and populace perceive themselves to be different and separate from the mainland. Will they perceive that there is something real and significant to be protected by resisting the PRC?"
In last year's report, the US believed that "perhaps the most important factor is the nature of the demands that Beijing imposes. If Beijing's demands [for granting Taiwan autonomy] are limited, then the threshold at which Taiwan would be willing to [give up its resistance and] negotiate may be lower." This year, how-ever, that factor was listed third, after the second factor, "Taiwan's assessment whether the US will assist in deterring and defeating PRC coercion."
The US clearly believes that current differences in domestic opinion in Taiwan severely affects its national security and that China is using this factor to divide the country.
As it did last year, the US states that China may already have gradually abandoned its past search for a method to militarily invade and occupy Taiwan in favor of a coercive strategy which stresses that Taipei should be forced to capitulate during the early days [of an invasion], before the US has come to the aid of Taiwan, so that China would never have to engage in ground warfare in Taiwan. In other words, the use of a wide-ranging, total solution consisting of military, political and economic means to create a comprehensive coercive force in order to send Taiwan the signal that resistance is futile and that des-truction or capitulation are the only two choices.
Beijing's main target is Tai-wan's leadership and its military and their will to resist. It aims to use the most economical method to achieve the greatest political benefit. The report also believes that China's assessment of Tai-wan's will to resist is crucial to the decision of whether or not Beijing will initiate an attack.
There are two aspects to this strategy. China may, without prior notice, take advantage of an initial surprise attack, deceiving and frightening the people of Taiwan, thus forcing the country to quickly give up any resistance. Methods would include missile and air attacks, information warfare and a sea blockade. Special forces, such as an amphibious-striking force or paratroopers, would rapidly occupy or destroy key facilities, causing the the nation's military to lose its will to resist.
"The PLA also could adopt a decapitation strategy, seeking to neutralize Taiwan's political and military leadership on the assumption that their successors would adopt policies more favorable to Beijing," the report said.
During the war in Iraq earlier this year, the US' scare tactics and decapitation strategy caused a rapid collapse in the will to resist of former president Saddam Hussein's government and therefore its defeat. This may have increased China's confidence in the use of such coercive strategies.
In the past, it was believed that China did not have the ability to land on, and occupy Taiwan, and that it therefore did not yet constitute a real threat to the country. The possibility, however, that China now will adopt such a coercive strategy, together with its improved strength, is leading the US to believe that this "may reflect an increasing willingness to consider the use of force to achieve unification."
The report also clearly shows that the US is concerned whether it will have time to dispatch conventional armed forces, centered around an aircraft carrier, to assist in Taiwan's defense in case of a Chinese attack. Perhaps the message to a Taiwanese legislative delegation visiting the US [earlier this year] that the country would have to defend itself for two weeks before US assistance could arrive reflects Washington's worries.
The other key aim of Beijing's strategy is delaying US involvement and how to use asymmetric strategies to counter the technological advantage of US forces in order to stop Washington from intervening before Taipei capitulates, in the end causing the US to accept a Taiwanese capitulation as a fait accompli.
Be it modern destroyers equipped with Sunburn missiles or Kilo-class submarines, China's arms purchases from Russia in recent years have clearly been meant to threaten US aircraft carriers. The gradual completion of China's second-generation nuclear arms over the next 10 years may also neutralize US security promises to Taipei.
Of course, the report also clearly reveals American hopes of influencing the debate regarding the nature of China's threat to Taiwan. After all, Taipei is the second-largest purchaser of US arms. The report once again points out longstanding worries about Taiwan's security. As politicians from every party in this country often point out, national security issues should not be partisan. Each party should make efforts to build a consensus regarding the protection of national security. They should also unite to ensure the establishment of a people's defense in response to China's highly political coercive strategy in order to prevent Tai-wan from being forced to compromise and negotiate under the threat to use military force.
Chen Shih-min is assistant professor in the department of political science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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