With all the drama surrounding Iraq and North Korea, Beijing looks like a cool customer. On Iraq, it quietly backed the French and German line to give international inspectors more time before the war. But, at the same time, it kept Washington hopeful that it might jump off the fence to support US-led military action or, at the very least, abstain on the second resolution.
On North Korea, Beijing is letting the Americans know that it is exerting quiet pressure on Pyongyang on the nuclear question, and is unhappy that Washington is not appreciative of its efforts.
On Taiwan, it appears that Beijing is planting press reports about progressively cutting its missiles directed across the Taiwan Strait.
The cumulative message appears to be that China is seeking to maintain its `strategic partnership' with the US. Taiwan, obviously, remains a major hurdle, with the US committed to its security in the event of a Chinese invasion. Washington is encouraging Taiwan to beef up its defenses, urging it to buy more advanced weapons because "surprise and speed will be used [by China] to make any potential assistance to Taiwan [by the US] in an unprovoked attack ineffective."
The reports about China thinning out its missile concentrations aimed at Taiwan must be read in this context. Beijing seemed to be saying to Washington that it has no intention to attack Taiwan, though it would refuse to go on record. The US should, therefore, curtail its arms sales to Taipei. In that case, Beijing might be cooperative in other areas, like Iraq and North Korea. On Iraq, for instance, there is political polarization between the "coalition of the willing," on one side, and France, Germany and Russia, on the other. Beijing might easily tilt toward the US to shore-up a "strategic partnership," which, in turn might give it the necessary leverage to influence the US policy on Taiwan, starting with some curbs on arms sales.
On North Korea, Beijing is in an even better position. Pyongyang is overwhelmingly dependent on Beijing for its economic lifeline, thin as it is. Imagine: China becoming part of an international sanctions regime to strangle its neighbor. True, this could provoke Pyongyang into some dangerously crazy adventure but at the cost of its imminent total destruction. Even its dear leader, Kim Jong-il, might not be too keen to make a radical move.
China, in a sense, is the Stalinist state's ultimate protector. Any drastic military action designed to bring down the last Cold War remnant will have to reckon with Beijing's unpredictable response. And if the Korean War is any guide, China might find itself, wittingly or unwittingly, drawn into a repeat of the last action -- this time with even more dangerous consequences. But if China were acting in concert with the US, it could manage the Korean imbroglio with greater dexterity. And this would enhance its influence with the US and regionally.
It has its own downside, though. As Hugh White, an Australian defense analyst, has pointed out, "Washington must be anxious about the [long-term] implications of normalization [on the Korean Peninsula] for the future of the US strategic footprint in North-East Asia. If tensions with North Korea reduce, Seoul will expect US military deployments in their country to be cut substantially" with its ripple effect on Japan. In that case, China alone might emerge with enhanced status and clout regionally by undercutting the US role.
Either way, short or long term, Beijing's privileged relationship with Pyongyang gives it a strategic advantage in dealing with the US in an ongoing political tug-of-war.
At the same time, there is an important constituency in the US that favors closer ties with China. An important segment of the US business community, with its growing investments and the lure of the Chinese market (more so after its entry into the WTO), is notable in this respect. During his recent tour of China for trade talks, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick emphasized the importance of a "new and deeper phase of Sino-US economic ties."
While aware of the myriad economic problems between the two countries, particularly China's growing trade surplus, he was keen to look into the "longer-term goal of our economic relationship." Which seemed to tally nicely with Wen Jiabao's (溫家寶) view that both countries should build their ties with a strategic view of a long-term relationship.
But any strategic partnership means shared interests and a shared world view. Neither exists at present or in the medium term. Even though China might see opportunities from a political spat that pits the US against France, Germany and Russia over Iraq, there is no strategic depth to a Sino-US relationship. China's concept of "strategic partnership" is for the US to facilitate its regional and global ambitions. Which means helping China to erode US supremacy.
There is a view that the US might have to accommodate China as a "strategic partner" over a period of time, because of its anticipated weak position. According to Norman Mailer, "Looking 20 years ahead, the [US] Administration perceives that there will come a time when China will have technology superior to ours [more Asians doing PhDs in science, technology and engineering]. When that time comes, the US might well say to China that `we can work together ? But don't try to dominate us.'" By then, one might as well say that it will be too late and China would have emerged as the brightest star on the horizon.
Of course, all this is based on the assumption that China, under its communist oligarchy, will continue to have smooth sailing while others (like the US) will get bogged down. Which is a tad too simplistic. However, if the US finds itself over-stretched on two fronts (Iraq and North Korea), compounded by the ongoing struggle against global terrorism, it can work to China's strategic advantage.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
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