Roh Moo-hyun (
What's worse is that many voices from South Korea and the international community criticized the policy as little more than South Korea's "pre-emptive concession" to its northern sibling. It gave the North many advantages but Kim Jong-il failed to live up to most of the promises he made to his southern counterpart, including a reciprocal visit to Seoul. Although Roh put forward the "peace and prosperity policy" as his new strategy in dealing with North Korea, this is simply a new tag attached to the original sunshine policy.
Ever since North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear arms program in October, the Kim Dae-jung administration has responded by conducting dialogue with the North and continuing with its economic aid. Roh will carry on with this policy. He took the anti-US stance as his main platform during the election campaign and, after being elected, has highlighted the importance of appeasing the North. No wonder he has already come into conflict with the US even before taking office. One can well imagine how unhappy the US feels with him, since US President George W. Bush skipped the inauguration ceremony and sent Secretary of State Colin Powell instead.
The US fumes at Pyongyang secretly building nuclear weapons in violation of the 1994 international accord, banishing inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the past six months and restarting the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon that was shut down in 1994. Washington has said many times that it does not want to take military action against North Korea but emphasized that the international community -- especially South Korea, Japan, China and Russia -- should put pressure on North Korea and demand that it halt its nuclear program.
The US also opposed the two Koreas' request for a US-North Korea bilateral meeting because it believes that North Korea's violation of the international accord and production of nuclear weapons are a multilateral problem in need of concerted handling by the international community, instead of being merely a bilateral issue.
Despite South Korea's opposition, the US still supports the IAEA's decision to transfer the issue of North Korea's transgression to the UN Security Council and discuss the imposition of sanctions.
South Korea has been concerned that Kim Jong-il might fly into a rage out of humiliation or even make unreasonable moves as the UN debates North Korea's violation. The envoy recently dispatched by Roh informed the Bush adminstration that South Korea would rather let the North possess nuclear weapons than adopt any military action or sanctions against it, which might lead to instability and war on the Korean Peninsula.
Apparently, the US and South Korea differ vastly on how to deal with North Korea and its nuclear development. In addition, in view of the escalating anti-US sentiment in South Korea, the Pentagon has thought about withdrawing its armed forces from this Asian nation, leaving it to handle North Korea on its own. The 50-year-old US-South Korea alliance is facing a severe test.
Although the US has frequently lobbied China to use its influence on North Korea, Beijing has gravely disappointed Washington. Powell just wound up his visit to China, during which he met with President Jiang Zemin (
Apparently China and the US have differing interests. Beijing is not willing to see North Korea collapse under outside pressure; it needs a buffer nation. Even if the UN imposes economic sanctions against North Korea, China would not support it.
China is now providing food, oil and other economic aid to North Korea. It will continue to assist the nation, maintaining the stability of Kim Jong-il's rule. North Korea's collapse and the two Koreas' unification are the last two things China would want to see. Due to their conflicting interests, the US government finally realizes that China is not a "friend in need."
It's worth noting that the US has said that it does not rule out the possibility of using military force against North Korea. Equally important, as the US attacks Iraq, the US will dispatch aircraft carriers to East Asian waters, warning China and North Korea that the US will not neglect peace and security in the East Asia region.
Parris Chang is a DPP legislator.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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