Tue, Jan 14, 2003 page8

• KMT's localization claim is empty

  • By James Wang 王景弘
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  Is the KMT an indigenous Taiwanese political party? Obviously the answer is no. In terms of "place of birth" and the way the KMT celebrated its anniversary it is not even an indigenous Chinese political party, let alone a Taiwanese one. Given that it was founded in Hawaii and reorganized in Tokyo it might be more appropriately called a Hawaiian party or a Japanese party.

  But when you ask if the KMT is a Taiwanized political party, the answer depends on whom you are asking. According to Lien Chan (連戰), chairman of the KMT, the answer is "yes." But Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), former chairman of the KMT, says "no." It is ironic that Lien tries to erase the 12 years under the leadership of Lee that are considered the most important era for Taiwanization and yet claims that the KMT is Taiwanized. In fact the KMT was Taiwanized by Lee, and is now being de-Taiwanized by Lien. Lien and his old KMT stalwarts insist that they are following the course set by late president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國). But they forget that Taiwanization was initiated by Chiang but carried out by Lee.

  For the KMT to be viable in Taiwan, Lien cannot reverse the course of Taiwanization. He tries instead to revise the definition of the term in order to confuse the voters and suit the KMT's political needs.

  What is Taiwanization? The term and the process emerged in the early 1970's when the ROC's international position deteriorated. At the conclusion of his five-year assignment as specialist in Taiwanese affairs at the US Embassy in Taipei, O. V. Armstrong wrote a telegram to the Department of State, headed, "The Taiwanization of Taiwan, or Can the Republic of China survive until 1984?"

  The report was identified as Armstrong's personal analysis and provoked some responses from other foreign service officers. But it made bold predictions on Taiwanization and its meaning to the US. Some of his predictions are a little wide of the mark, but the gist of his analysis has proven correct.

  "The mainlander Chinese who brought the Republic of China to Taiwan and preserved it here for over 20 years are slowly but inevitably disappearing from the political scene," according to Armstrong. "Meanwhile, education, urbanization and rapid social change steadily undermine their control over the native-born Taiwanese. By 1984, the Taiwanese will start gaining real political power if they do not take over completely before then."

  Once the Taiwanese gained real political power, Armstrong predicted, they would alter or abolish so many existing policies and institutions, that "the island will undergo a virtual political revolution." He argued that even though the younger generation of Taiwanese were educated by mainlanders, they have retained a strong sense of a separate Taiwanese identity and community interests. "They would, for example, drop the claim that a government on Taiwan is that of all China, abandon the counterattack and cut the armed forces," he said.

  Armstrong suggested that the mainlander-run government, "must somehow be encouraged to transfer more real power to the Taiwanese and acquiesce in the eventual Taiwanization of the Republic of China." He also advocated that the US "must learn to accept the Taiwanization of the Republic of China. We must not allow ourselves to become isolated with the hopeless mainlander right wing determined to hold onto their power at all cost."

  Reading from Armstrong's analysis, Taiwanization involves the Taiwanese gaining real political power and the ROC becoming Taiwanized. That was exactly what happened in the late 1980's and 1990's under Chiang and Lee.

  You have to give Chiang credit for starting the long process of Taiwanization. He had the vision. He had the heart for reform. He knew how to avoid disaster by staying ahead of pressure. But changes in the international environment and the buildup of international and domestic pressures played an even more significant role in prompting Chiang to commit to Taiwanization.

  The first landmark of Taiwanization was the nomination of Chiang as premier in 1972. This was the year in which the ROC was kicked out of the UN and then US president Richard M. Nixon visited China. These "one-two" punches totally destroyed the fiction that ROC was the sole legal government of all China.

  Even such a usually silent hardliner as then foreign minister Shen Chang-huan (沈昌煥) confided to then ambassador Walter McConaughy of the US in November 1972 that,"Until last year `one China' meant the ROC. Now `one China' means the PRC."

  Shen complained that many leaders in Southeast Asia had "misread the Shanghai communique and believed that the US accepted Peking's position on Taiwan."

  Recognizing the change in the international situation, young scholars and intellectuals, mainlanders and Taiwanese, publicly urged the government to carry out overdue reforms in order to save Taiwan from Chinese annexation. The proposed reforms included increases in the numbers of Taiwanese in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly through supplemental elections, the recruitment of qualified Taiwanese into government and adjustments to foreign policy.

  In response, Chiang's father, President Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), and Chiang himself, adopted a salami tactic of increasing the numbers of Taiwanese legislators and members of the National Assembly in a limited fashion. Chiang Kai-shek also doubled the number of Taiwanese in his Cabinet from three to six.

  The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of State, put out an intelligence note, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Taiwanese," on June 21, 1972, commenting that these appointments seemed designed more to improve the government's image than to enhance Taiwanese power substantially. "While those Taiwanese chosen will be in his debt, the Taiwanese majority are likely to see them as the beginning of a process leading eventually to real Taiwanese political power."

  One of those appointments was the 49-year-old Lee Teng-hui. The intelligence note drew attention to the fact that Lee did not really fit the mold of the other appointments. It said that Lee had been associated with the reform-minded Taiwanese who published the controversial magazine Ta-hsueh (大學). His selection may have been intended by Chiang Ching-kuo, also affectionately referred to as CCK, to cement the support of this group, which was influential among students and intellectuals.

  No matter what the then-premier Chiang Ching-kuo's motives were, the analysis said, the new appointments pointed to eventual advancement of Taiwanese to positions of real power.

  Obviously, the US encouraged Chiang to recruit more Taiwanese into the government. McConaughy reported to the State Department on his June 21, 1972, meeting with him that, "in response to some encouraging remarks I made on the appointments of several well-qualified Taiwanese to key positions in the government, CCK made an appropriate acknowledgement, and said that he was resolved to bring new men of ability and ideas into positions of responsibility, and move them up to higher positions if and when they proved themselves."

  McConaughy reported that CCK cited the appointments of two very promising Taiwanese as vice minister of economic affairs (Yang Chi-chuan, 楊基烇) and vice minister of education (Kuo Wei-fan, 郭為藩) to emphasize his point that the vice ministerial post is as important as the ministerial post. And when McConaughy spoke highly of Lee Teng-hui, CCK responded that Lee had been jumped several grades to ministerial status because he had been struck by his brilliant and unconventional, yet practical ideas, combined with good executive talent.

  Chiang Ching-kuo wanted the US to know that he had not only appointed Taiwanese to the ministerial posts, but also to the vice ministerial posts, in case the Americans failed to pay attention to the facts.

  Another piece of evidence that showed Chiang had been under pressure, or encouraged by the US, to broaden the base of his government by recruiting more Taiwanese into the government was a declassified record of conversations between then secretary of state William Rogers and Taiwan's ambassador to the US James Shen on June 19, 1973.

  Having returned to Washington after consultations in Taipei, Shen was, on Chiang's instructions, to communicate to the US the key policy positions of his government. According to the record, the first point Chiang wanted him to convey was an assurance to the US government that he would do everything possible to preserve internal stability. His government was committed to including more Taiwanese in government."Premier had, for example, named six Taiwanese to his sixteen-men Cabinet. He also brought more Taiwanese and young people into the economic planning apparatus. Premier will continue to introduce native born into government positions because he realizes that this action contributes to political stability," the record stated.

  In short, Chiang assured the US that he understood that bringing more Taiwanese into the government was necessary for the stability of Taiwan and he would therefore continue to do it.

  With regard to the Taiwanization of the ROC, the US Embassy in Taipei reported to the State Department on March 6, 1973, that, "both government and citizens [of the ROC] reject reunion with the PRC and there is near universal agreement on the desirability of continued separation or independence from mainland control."

  Although the declassified files of the late 1970's and the 1980's are not available yet, it can be confidently assumed that the pressure on Chiang to give Taiwanese real political power continued to build up domestically and internationally.

  The US' choice to detract its recognition of the ROC in 1979 and the Taiwanese opposition's challenge to the KMT intensified the pace of democratization which would eventually lead to Taiwanization.

  By exiling General Wang Shen (王昇) to Paraguay and announcing that no one from his family should succeed him, Chiang clearly indicated his resolve to surrender real political power to the Taiwanese.

  And, while he continued to insist, "No Contact, No Negotiation, No Compromise," Chiang lifted the ban on visits to China by veterans before he died. This humanitarian policy carried an important political message: The veterans would have the free choice to live in China or settle down in a democratic Taiwan.

  Chiang and his father had long given up the "counterattack" policy against China and a Taiwanized ROC would not accept the PRC's control in the name of unification.

  In a sense, Armstrong was right in making that bold prediction in 1970. He was wrong by only a few years. Lee was right in carrying out Taiwanization during his 12-year tenure as president of the ROC and charging that the KMT under Lien's leadership is not Taiwanized. And Lien is wrong when he claims that the KMT has been Taiwanized while advocating unification with the PRC.

  The sovereign territory of the Taiwanized Republic of China includes Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen and Matsu. Recovery of the Chinese Mainland and the unification of China are not on its agenda.

  James Wang is a Washington-based journalist.
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