Much of the world has become aware that Taiwan is a democracy. The collateral benefit, aside from the freedom of Taiwan's 23 million people, has been the potential for that democracy to set an example that would spread to its giant neighbor -- the PRC. For me, it was a privilege to have been involved in a small way while this virtual revolution blossomed and transformed the country's political system. It was like a breath of fresh air as freedom flourished and the future looked so bright for Taiwan.
But in only a decade, while the nation's democratic traditions are still maturing, changes across the Strait are bringing a challenge that have the potential to reverse that revolution. If democracy were allowed to fail in Taiwan, the damage would be devastating, not only to Taiwan, but to all of East Asia. Where the present changes in cross-strait relations are leading remains unclear to everyone. The best of economists and political scientists project their views of the future in terms of their own specialty, but separately. When it comes to analyzing the cross-strait situation, the question of how the changing economic relationship will affect political relations, or vice-versa, brings the wisest in both fields of study to demur on stating an opinion.
In Taiwan, it is not only unclear where future developments will go, but it is unclear where Taiwan wants them to go. The challenges Taiwan faces are awesome. To meet them will take an unusual demonstration of strength in leadership, a patriotism among the people that is still developing and a political will to bring consensus on the critical subject of sovereignty that has not been evident in this new democracy.
Taiwan today faces an economy that must make a fundamental restructuring within a very short period of time or be marginalized; a Chinese economy that is growing rapidly and offers many opportunities, while at the same time representing a threat to Taiwan's existence as an independent entity; a China that is able to influence much of the rest of the world to support its objective on Taiwan's sovereignty; a domestic political atmosphere that is losing the trust of the voters and damaging credibility in the political system; and ineffective communication between government and the people.
That may be a harsh assessment, but it is in no way partisan as both the ruling and opposition parties are responsible. I recently asked a friend who follows events in the Koreas and other Asian countries how he saw the difference between presidential elections in South Korea and the Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral and city council races. He thought South Korean election campaigns were very tough, but in Taiwan they were "down and dirty." I interpret that to mean more than money politics. It was also the difference in the degree to which the people and the politicians they elected place patriotism and national sovereignty above the "quick buck" and partisan advantage.
Given the internal political priorities that seem to dominate the national agenda and the slow pace in addressing the internal and external challenges that Taiwan faces, it is not unreasonable to ponder the question: What if democracy fails in Taiwan?
Domestically, with an eye to their own personal economic problems, some of the people of Taiwan may come to believe that being under a special administrative region of China may be no worse than experiencing economic hardship under the status quo. It could look like trading one uncertainty for another. They could develop a perception that their freedom is not at stake -- that democracy could be maintained. But is democracy sustainable under the sovereignty of a nation that opposes it? Not likely.
But what if a majority expresses at least an acceptance of some type of unification, dressed up with a more desirable-sounding nomenclature and the promises of special privileges? It may be that there would be considerable opposition to such a decision, but, given the relative absence of a sense of patriotism, the differences over Taiwan's national status, the temptations represented by China's growing economy and the continuous political standoff, which hinders progress, any opposition that would stand against it may prove not to be very effective.
Then there is the likely external impact on such a decision. This factor does not seem to get much public attention in Taiwan. When it does, it usually is in terms of the US, with its security interests throughout all of East Asia in jeopardy, coming to help to prevent an unwanted unification with China. But democracy in Taiwan has brought a different dimension to this scenario. While there has been a clear strengthening of US-Taiwan security relations, so has there been a greater emphasis on the people's democratic right to decide Taiwan's relationship with China.
In terms of US interests, the potential problem of security in East Asia is the most important, but, at least for the medium term, American military strength will continue to prevail. But a Taiwan that voluntarily decided to become a part of China would not likely be prevented from doing so, and in addition to the problem of security in the region, another, perhaps just as significant problem would be the backward step of democracy.
For China's leadership, gaining Taiwan would, without question, bolster their political strength domestically. But more important, it would strengthen, perhaps irretrievably, the PRC leadership's insistence that democracy is not appropriate to Asia. The impact of that in Taiwan, and in other countries in the region that have moved toward democracy, would be disastrous. Freedom would have taken a major step backward. Despite its small size and its undefined status in the international community, what Taiwan does matters in a much larger, international arena.
How much better it would be if politicians businessmen and people throughout the island would come to accept the responsibility of making democracy work in Taiwan.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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