Conventional wisdom has it that foreign policy doesn't matter in domestic elections. Unless there is a war or some threat from abroad, the pundits maintain that voters don't care about what's happening overseas. But this argument overlooks the key role that foreign policy plays in earning politicians political brownie points.
Since the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been engaged in a political crossfire on the so-called "sovereignty" issue, foreign policy in Taiwan is almost a synonym for cross-strait policy. With the public divided between the pro-independence and pro-unification camps, there is plenty of room for politicians to use cross-strait issues to win electoral support.
The debate about the extent to which the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration will respond to Chinese leaders' recent calls for direct transport links across the Taiwan Strait has created an arena for further political maneuvers. While the KMT and PFP called for an early opening of links, the government insisted that the sides of the Strait must talk before a proposal to organize charter flights from Taipei to Shanghai during the Lunar New Year holidays could be put into effect. The administration also stressed that Taiwan should not be marginalized or treated as a local government in negotiations.
It is clear that Beijing's strategy is to "unite the secondary enemy to fight against the chief enemy." Hand in hand with Taiwan's opposition and businessmen, who are mostly in favor of unification, the Chinese leaders have skillfully imposed further pressure on the Chen administration. That explains why Chen and his government have been trying to explain to the public that opening direct links is not a panacea for the economy. In recent campaign rallies for the Taipei mayoral election, Chen publicly criticized certain pan-blue politicians, inclu-ding Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), for kowtowing to Beijing.
With politicians in Taiwan trying to use the direct links to gain political points, the result is national disunity and an opportunity for China to penetrate Tai-wan's political and economic systems.
When it comes to cross-strait relations, a key indicator is the extent to which Beijing understands Taiwan's domestic politics. In terms of bridging the political gap between Taipei and Beijing, Chen has offered an olive branch to his counterpart by expressing willingness to resume dialogue and relaxing restrictions on investment in China.
But Chen's moderate approach to the other side has been met with negativity. Not only have the Chinese leaders ignored Chen's efforts, but they have bypassed his administration and dealt only with certain pro-unification figures. But Beijing has learned the a lesson from the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections -- that verbal threats and military intimidation will not subdue the people of Taiwan. Indeed, these helped Bei-jing's bete noire, the DPP, to gain power.
A modification of policy was needed and a line of thought was developed that harked back to what Chinese leaders had said in the past. It started with Vice Premier Qian Qichen's (錢其琛) announcement in January that "members of Chen's DPP are welcome to visit China in the appropriate capacities." Qian also called for renewed dialogue and stronger economic ties across the Strait.
The optimistic view argues that it is time for China to recognize political reality. That is, Bei-jing must accept the fact that Chen is the decision-maker. There will be no cross-strait progress without China dealing directly with Chen.
The conservative view, however, argues that since China is facing other controversial issues, including the leadership succession and WTO compliance, Bei-jing will continue to play its "wait and see" card with Chen. Changes in Taiwan's politics, in other words, will determine Beijing's policy toward Taipei. So conservatives consider, for example, whether the DPP's legislative election victory of last December and the rise of the TSU have offered some flexibility for Taipei in cross-strait relations.
Even if Chen can handle the unification/independence debate well, it is still possible that domestic factors could spin out of control and undermine his performance. The deterioration of the economy, due largely to international factors, could further intensify Beijing's belief that using economic weapons to sabotage Chen's popularity is a better strategy than using military force.
The aim of such a strategy would be to oust Chen in the 2004 election. Such a strategy, of course, would tend to reduce the prospects of any improvement in bilateral relations or a resumption of talks anytime soon. Beijing, of course, will not wish to give Chen any credit for the opening of links and neither will the opposition. So, the cross-strait stalemate will continue and, indeed, further solidify.
The about-face in Beijing's strategy toward Taipei is the product of Taiwan's domestic political situation. It is also influenced by the changing balance of power in China. Like Taiwan's political parties, Beijing is counting on domestic uses of cross-strait policy to win over Taiwan. This situation poses the greatest challenge to the Chen administration. While the DPP is the largest party in the legislature, it has been having difficulties establishing an absolute majority.
How Chen resolves domestic issues and incorporates into his strategy the idea of healthy party competition will determine his chances of winning the 2004 election.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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