In the US, the government seems to be continuing with its attitude that the noise of political debate heard coming from Taipei is the noise of democracy at work. It's an attitude that did not exist before Taiwan's 2000 presidential election, even though democracy had emerged a decade before then.
This attitude is tested from time to time, such as when Taiwan makes unexpected statements that seem to change policy directions on cross-strait relations or when it cuts defense spending at a time when the US is trying to strengthen Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Usually, apprehension in the US subsides as the actions are seen to be a part of a democratic debate in a free country.
However, this attitude is more prevalent within the government, which has access to a great deal of information, than it is outside. The US is also a democracy and grassroots perceptions based on public debate and the pressures of interest groups often influence policy direction on controversial issues. The stronger the debates and pressures, the more controversial an issue becomes and the more political leadership tends to alter policy (or its statements about it) to narrow the differences. Under normal circumstances it's part of the natural, democratic process. Economic issues, up to a point, follow such a pattern in bilateral relations between two democratic countries.
The fundamental difference in US-Taiwan relations is, of course, cross-strait issues, because it has important consequences for US interests. In Taiwan, just about every public debate, regardless of the subject, somehow seems to become a cross-strait issue.
The impact public debate has on many US interest groups and on those in the general public with an interest in foreign relations is important. Groups that include Taiwan, China and East Asia among their concerns use what they hear from Taiwan and China to further their own biases and for many others there is an inclination to accept whatever biases their own local media publish.
The overwhelming number of people in the US have, at best, just a passing interest in events taking place in Taiwan. This includes US political leaders and international businessmen. The perceptions they have formed over the past decade are based on what they have heard or read -- Taiwan has been moving toward democracy, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) visited Cornell University, there was a missile crisis in 1996 and the government changed hands in an open election. These perceptions may be exaggerated and unbalanced, but decisions are too often based on these nonetheless.
Despite these vague recollections, several perceptions are firm and unquestionable -- China is a communist country, Taiwan is a free one; China wants Taiwan to be a part of China and Taiwan does not; and most people believe their country sympathizes with Taiwan.
There has been little news about Taiwan lately, with US attention focusing on terrorism, Iraq, the Middle East and the economy. But should there occasionally be some bits of news, one can imagine how puzzled most Americans must be.
They could easily develop a vague perception that Taiwan, of its own volition, is making its economy part of China's; that Taiwan will be linking its transportation system to China's; that Taiwan now seems much more sensitive to any criticism about China; that the legislature is considering a law that permits private entities to negotiate national issues with "private" entities in China; and that, most astoundingly, there is criticism from within the legislature about the establishment of a Taiwan Democracy Foundation because it might hurt China's feelings.
This confusion is not limited to those with only a vague notion of Taiwan. There are tens of thousands of Chinese- and Taiwanese-Americans with a greater interest and understanding of Taiwan and China.
What exists now in the broadly defined Chinese-American community are those who remain close to and support Beijing; those who are dissidents that oppose the PRC in its present form (but want another that includes Taiwan); those who left China in much earlier times and hope for a China that is both free and includes Taiwan; and those that want an independent Taiwan. The largest number in that broad community, however, are those who are too busy with their work to pay much attention either way.
Many in the Chinese-American community are also confused, although the politically active among them individually know exactly what they want. Unfortunately, as a community they are sharply divided. As they are often seen by the American general public as experts on China and Taiwan, this lack of consensus adds to the confusion. The confusion, however, may not be confined to inattentive Americans.
To what degree is there confusion among the general public in Taiwan itself? If we are now witnessing in Taiwan the degree to which almost any issue is weighed in cross-strait terms, and there are still two years before the next presidential elections, what will it be like in the months ahead?
Will the divisions (or, more politely, the lack of consensus on national identity) deepen? Will the views of the general public in Taiwan change? Given the increasing number of polls, each with its own biases and wording, will any change even be discernible?
Why should such questions, clearly internal matters for Taiwan, be of such interest to the US?
There are several reasons, especially regarding security in the region. But the US at the highest level of government has committed itself to accept the "assent" of the people on Taiwan on the issue of its national identity. With all the changes, and confusion, how well will the people's wishes be known?
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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