The British prime minister Ben-jamin Disraeli once said of the various categories of untruth that there were, in growing order of magnitude, "lies, damned lies, and statistics." To which we can now add a fourth category, reaching a whole new height (or is it depth?) -- the statistics of Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
It has been a recurrent feature of Ma's re-election campaign in recent weeks to cite Asiaweek maga-zine's annual Asia's Best Cities survey to show the success of Ma's city administration.
In particular, the statistic he dwells on is that in 1999, the first year of his term as mayor, Taipei's ranking in Asiaweek's survey rose from fifth to second place.
Now it so happens that between 1996 and 1999 I was Asiaweek's correspondent in Taipei. As a result, I know rather a lot about the way the magazine's surveys were compiled. I did not contribute to the article that accompanied the release of the 1999 results as I was too busy with the recently launched Taipei Times.
I did, however, see the data from which this survey was compiled and recommended to Asia-week the journalist who actually did the reporting from Taipei. Previous to this I handled the survey reporting for 1996, 1997 and 1998. In regard to Asiaweek's methodology I can claim to know what I am talking about.
Asiaweek's surveys consisted largely of getting a swathe of official statistics, picking out what they regarded as key indicators, giving these indicators a weight within a scoring framework and eventually calculating an overall score.
At the risk of burdening readers with detail, the aspects of urban life on which Asiaweek collected information were: Average life expectancy; hospital beds per 1,000 people; per-capita state expenditure for education; average class size in primary school; university-educated people as a percentage of total population; density of sulfur dioxide in the air; density of dust and suspended particles in the air; average monthly rental per square meter; ratio of housing prices to income; square meters of parks and fields per capita; vehicles per km of city road; existence of a mass transit rail system; number of movie theaters per 100,000 people; unemployment rate; GDP growth; annual urban inflation rate; vacation and public holidays per year; criminal cases for every 10,000 persons; number of telephones per 1,000 people; average time taken to commute to work; number of TV sets per 1,000 people; percentage of population with sewerage; percentage of population with piped water; and, finally, average income.
These 24 topics were then put into eight subgroups. They were given a weighting according to their importance within the group, and the groups themselves were weighted as to the proportion of the overall score they contributed.
The subgroups and the proportion they contributed to the total number of points were -- economic opportunity (15 possible points); quality of education (15); environment and sanitation (15); health care (15); transportation (10); personal security (10); housing cost (10); and leisure (10).
The surveys were entirely statistics-driven. Asiaweek would compile the data, work out the ranking and tell their reporter to go and get some official explanation and perhaps anecdotal evidence of just why the city scored what it did. Note that neither the reporter's own viewpoint, nor the information that he or she acquired had any bearing on the final ranking. Statistics were all.
Any reader who considers this methodology will immediately be aware of two things. First, that such statistics don't tell the whole story -- they don't for example explain why Georgetown on Malaysia's Penang island is a delightful place, while higher-scoring Taipei is regarded by foreign companies as a hardship posting.
Second, that the degree to which any city government can change many of these items quickly is limited.
This is either because they involve the building of infrastructure as part of a long-term project -- you cannot build a mass rapid transit system in a few months, nor a hospital nor a school; even parks in Taipei can take decades between zoning and construction. Or it is because they involve areas over which either the central government retains a large amount of control -- anything, for example, to do with the economy, education or health -- or which belong to the private sector -- most entertainment and leisure facilities for example.
So here is the first question I hope the DPP's Lee Ying-yuan (
Asiaweek closed down last year so it is not possible to get its raw data on which the 1998 and 1999 assessments were made. But of the data published, the main differences between the two years was an enormous 25 percent increase in average income and a similarly large increase in state spending on education. Of other factors, pollution fell slightly, as did house prices, while traffic density actually rose, and crime remained static.
Both income levels and education spending are determined by the central rather than city government, so Ma can hardly take credit for them. What can he take credit for?
According to Asiaweek's reporter in 1999 -- not much. That part of the survey report which deals with Taipei exclusively mentions Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) as being behind the improvements which had raised Taipei's rank drastically since Asiaweek began its surveys in 1996.
On top of this, I have evidence to show that Ma's administration actually provided Asiaweek with so few figures updated for 1999 that most of the figures the magazine used were in fact full-year figures for 1998 -- the last year of Chen's administration.
But I have one more question I would like to see Lee Ying-yuan ask Ma. If Ma wants to take credit for the 1999 survey results which put Taipei in second place, up from fifth, then he certainly has to take responsibility for the 2000 result. Unfortunately that year saw Taipei slip from second place to fourth. A 9.7 percent drop in average income was one reason for this.
But didn't I say that average income was a factor determined by the central rather than the city government? Well here's one factor that is a city matter, and was also responsible for Taipei's slipping so drastically: a 56 percent increase in crime -- according to Asiaweek's figures. How is Mayor Ma going to explain that?
Laurence Eyton is the managing editor of the Taipei Times. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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